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Except for heavier teaching loads, there is nothing, at the
moment, that the scholarly community is calling for less than
another scholarly periodical. Indeed, the cries echoing in some
quarters for a moratorium on scholarly publication—lest we suf
focate beneath the weight and pressure of printed matter issuing
continuously from every corner of the intellectual community—
remind us, if reminding we need, how very far behind we are in
our periodical reading. But this publication, whose maiden issue
you now possess, will serve, we think, several important needs.
First, The Ouerbein Miscellany will give to those members of
the faculty, hitherto unpublished, an opportunity to get into print
in a publication whose editorial board promises to brood, if
necessary, over their manuscripts: rejection slips will be de
livered with charity; no cold and impersonal return mail envel
opes will mysteriously appear on the desks of our contributors.
Therefore, we shall happily accept a fragment of a thesis or of
a dissertation, reworked into an article; or an idea, gestating in
class notes for years, but never until now licked into shape.
Second, we believe that this publication can expose, in the
nakedness of print, various disciplines of the Otterbein faculty
to one another. Therefore, we solicit contributions from every
department of the college in the hope that every effort for the
creation of mutual intellectual sympathy and understanding,
rather than mere mutual tolerance, will serve us all in the trans
formation of our students into gentlemen—the practical end,
according to Cardinal Newman, of an institution like Otterbein
College.
The realization of an Otterbein College faculty publication is
the result of the efforts of many people. To Dr. Robert Price we
are especially grateful for his gentle urgings along the way
toward publication. Indeed, for the contributions of Dr. Robert
Price and Dr. Paul Frank, both of whom have enviable publica
tions credits—we are grateful: their experience in the business
of scholarly writing has given our modest publication stature;
their example, we trust, will encourage other published members
of the faculty to contribute their articles to future numbers of the
publication. We should like also to thank Mr. Craig Gifford for
his advice on the mechanics of publication and his staff for
preparing copy for the printer. Finally, we should like to express
our gratitude to Dean James V. Miller and especially to President
Lynn W. Turner, without whose encouragement and consent we
could not have engaged in this new venture.
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SOME ENNATIJRAL HISTORY AT SELBORNE
by
Robert Price

home” readers of the nineties could not be told that cattle
droppings supply living quarters for a variety of insect life.
Then in Letter X, I began to be aware that the British “cock
bird” was consistently being changed to “male bird”-a nicety
that had to be observed so frequently that the editors finally
gave it up in Letter XX. These were only the mild beginnings.
Though White had never been in the least offensive, the
Boston purifiers had felt that, no matter how slight the allusion,
under no circumstances could any hint of excrement be mentioned-not even that of beetles or of field crickets, and cer
tainly not of jackasses. Unpleasant smells were also taboo,
whether from putrefied animal teeth, from bats, or the techniques“se defendendo” of certain creatures such as “the
squnck, or stonck,” who is otherwise “an innocuous and sweet
animal.” The Augean cleansing also removed mention of how
sand martins clean their nests, of cats and dogs washing up
their youngsters, of cuckoos’ posterior peculiarities, and even
the simple note that blue titmice “frequently pick bones off
dunghills.” Greenhouses had to be prepared with “manure” not
dung,” and it could not even be known that the stable window
where a particularly knowing horse had learned to escape was
the one “through which dung was thrown.”
The crowning assininity of the clean-up, though, was the
editor’s oversight in keeping one of White’s innocent looking
footnotes, a mere reference to Tobit 11.10. Who, even a Boston
editor of the nineties, might have guessed that the dignified
Apocryphal allusion described the dangers potential to eyes if
one peers up the inside of a high chimney toward nesting and
roosting swifts?

The recent arrival of an attractive “Dolphin” paperback
edition of Gilbert White’s Natural History of Selborne (1789)
has started me wondering whether the publishers may not have
missed a sure-fire sales trick in not tagging the blue-and-white
cover with a challenging “COMPLETE AND UNEXPURGATED”-as indeed this latest printing most properly and inno
cently is.
Several years ago, reminded that I had been intending for
over forty years to read Selborne, Gilbert White’s beloved
nature essays from the eighteenth-century British countryside,
I set out in search of a copy only to discover that the one
edition immediately at hand was Ginn & Company’s Boston
printing of 1896, edited by Edward S. Morse. This I located in a
nearby campus library, where it had been accessioned in 1923
and had been lent just once-in 1941-very likely to an unsus
pecting freshman searching blindly for “research” filler. White
won me at once to his sand martins and mice, crickets, sedge
warblers and old Sussex turtle. His trained echo especially
intrigued me, for our satellite age was just beginning and the
famous Selborne voice that White taught to repeat ten syllables
of quick dactyllic Latin verse seemed as contemporary as
Cape Kennedy.
Then I happened to turn back to a “Publisher’s Note” and
to my dismay read: “It has been thought best in this edition of
of White’s Selborne, which has been edited for school and home
use, to omit certain passages objectionable on account of the
plainness of the language ...” In Selborne? In what must cer
tainly be the most innocent, unsophisticated and honest report
of simple outdoor realities in all our literature! What under the
canopy of the Hampshire heavens could possibly have run the
danger of offending American sensitivities of the 1890’s?
Presently I was comparing the carefully edited “Everyman
Library” text and (from a second-hand dealer) Richard Kearton’s handsome illustrated edition of 1902. The findings were
most dispiriting.
Although I was prepared to find the usual Victorian squeam
ishness toward exposing any life processes to bare print, I was
not quite ready for the shock when I discovered in the very
first major omission (Letter VIII) that American “school and

After such “nasty niceness,” as my old Aunt Martha used
to call it, sex would surely not stand much chance here, and it
didn’t. There could be no hint of the mating techniques of toads
or frogs, I discovered. Or of the chum owl seen “pursuing the
hen in a toying way through the boughs of a tree.” Or of the
partridge hen that, when hunters kill her mate, finds “another
paramour.” Or even of male and female chaffinches flocking
separately in winter!
White’ s superb description of the dashingly beautiful mating
flights of martins, swallows and swifts had to be left out. And,
of course, such grossness as the folk notion that turtles take a
whole month “in performing one feat of copulation,” a leisure
liness “suitable to the composure” of such an animal. Yet, the
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editor did not mind leaving in an allusion to the flocks of
Laban” and the variegated breed that Jacob accomplished there.
It could not be stated that newly born hedgehogs are soft
and flexible; otherwise “the poor dam would have a bad time of
it in the critical- moment of parturition.” Earthworms could not
be mentioned as “hermaphrodites.” Four whole chapters had to
be excised because they contained accounts of animal hus
bandry’s use of emasculation, and of a sow that attained a ripe
old age of seventeen with litters totaling three hundred, and of
a cat that adopted an orphaned hare and nursed it along with
her kittens. This particular wholesale chopping even changed
the numbering of White’s last thirty-two chapters!
“During the deluges of last September,” White wrote of the
British gypsies’ hard life, “did a young gypsy-girl lie-in the
midst of our hop-garden, on the cold ground, with nothing but a
piece of blanket extended on a few hazel-rods.” The editor
omitted “-in” from the verb, thus willfully changing both spirit
and fact of the passage.
But for me the most unnecessary mangling of all came,
alas, in White’s famous accounts of his mice. His report of the
tiny harvest mouse in a notable “first” in British zoology, I
have read, and his description of it includes some of his most
vividly sensitive writing. The round ball of a nest that he
found atop a thistle he called “this wonderful procreant cradle,”
but the editor had killed the poetry by excising “procreant.”
Marvelingat the wonder before him. White went on to ask, “...as
this nest was perfectly full, how could the dam come at her
little ones respectively so as to administer a teat to each?”
But transcribed for American minds the dramatic specificness
had been reduced to “...how could the mother-mouse come to
her litter so as to administer nourishment to each?”
And then the unkindest cut of all-again with the mice!
White had recorded an instance of what is one of my own most
exciting early memories from mid-Western harvest fields, seeing
a mother mouse rescuing her young in a way so spectacular
that my British-born uncle would even hold back the eager dogs
in order to protect the smaller creatures. White too had stood in
wonder and admiration at the strange sight of a large, whitebellied field-mouse struggling laboriously to get away from
danger “with three or four young clinging to her teats by their
mouths and feet.” For Americans, the key word “teats” had to
be omitted!
6

After that, I could not even smile when I noticed that the
editor’s dulling wits had caught two “bitches” in Letter XVII
of Part Two and curbed them into mere “females,” but had
inadvertently let a third run loose!
Selbome still seems refreshingly contemporaneous.
LIST OF EDITIONS CITED
White, Gilbert. The Natural History o] Selbome, ed. Edward S. Morse
Boston, 1896.
--------------------. The Natural History of Selbome, ed. Richard Kearton,
London, 1902.
-------------------- . The Natural History of Selbome, ed. R. M. Lockley,
London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. (Everyman Library), 1949.
--------------------. The Natural History of Selbome, Garden City, New
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. (Dolphin Books), 1961.
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TWO POEMS
by
Norman Chaney

Bride and Groom
You came to me at midday
In the prick of passion,
While birds screeched corrosive sounds
Into our ears.
Our bodies bristled like a thistle
Till the thistle plumed:
Pod-puff on fragrant air.
You came to me at evening
In the wilt of passion,
Slow afoot and thin:
Our vacant eyes watched butterflies
Play shinny-up-the-wind.

Who Will Not Stay
Farewell traveller.
You impatient of farewells.
Before you’ve gone a country mile
Perhaps you’ll stop to rest awhile.
The host who comes to serve you meat
Will loose the latchets of your feet.
And quick before you rise to part
He’ll snip the stitchings of your heart.
Resting there deplete and thin.
You’ll rue your lack of patience then.
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MR. BARRON’S SILTED WHARF
by
John H. Laubach
In 1833 the United States Supreme Court had before it a case
of fundamental importance. The decision of that case has con
tinued to cast a shadow upon the meaning and enforcement of
civil rights in the United States. It was one of the first links in
a chain of events which have culminated in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
Mr. Barron owned a wharf within the limits of Baltimore,
Maryland. Baltimore officials undertook to divert some streams
in the interest of street improvements. This stream diversion
had the effect of depositing silt around Barron’s wharf to the
extent that he could no longer derive revenues from its use.
Barron’s heirs maintained that this action on the part of the
municipality deprived him of a livelihood. They instituted legal
proceedings, charging that this action amounted to a “taking”
of his property. This “taking,” they asserted, entitled them to
“just compensation.”^
In making this claim for “just compensation,” the litigants
relied on a provision in the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution, a clause of the Fifth Amendment which prescribes:
“...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” It was unchallenged that the City of Balti
more was an agency of the State of Maryland. Baltimore further
admitted that its stream diversion had resulted in a taking of
Barron’s “private property” for “public use” without giving
him “just compensation.” While admitting these points, Balti
more challenged the legal basis of the suit by asserting that
the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution had no
applicability to a state or one of its subdivisions. If this point
prevailed, Barron’s heirs were foreclosed from making any
claims for just compensation on the basis of the relevant pro
visions of the Bill of Rights.
^Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243 (1833); United States Supreme

Court decisions are normally cited in the names of the parties.
Volume numbers precede and page numbers follow the reference to
the particular report. In the earliest days of reporting, the name of
the reporter, as in this case “Peters,” was placed between the
volume number and the page number. Where'“U.S.” appears between
the volume and the page numbers, the reference is to the volumes of
United States Reports. Where the citation refers to “L. Ed.,” the
reference is to United States Supreme Court Reports, commonly
referred to as the “law edition.”
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Presiding over the United States Supreme Court at that time
was John Marshall who was nearly at the end of a thirty-five
year term conspicuously devoted to strengthening the Union.
Often with brilliance, Marshall had restricted the powers of the
states by his opinions which generously interpreted the powers
of the federal government. Marshall’s logical underpinning of the
broad construction of the federal powers had been unassailable.^
It was expected that Marshall and his court would follow the
tendency of previous decisions by invoking the Bill of Rights
against Baltimore’s treatment of Mr. Barron. This would have
been a second major blow at the sovereignty of Maryland.^
It caused some astonishment, therefore, when Chief Justice
Marshall announced that the Supreme Court was dismissing
Barron’s suit on the basis that Baltimore and the state urged:
namely, that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal
government and offered no protection against arbitrary state
actions. Marshall pointed out that the states, at the time they
insisted upon the adoption of the Bill of Rights as a condition
for their acceptance of the Constitution, had their own bills of
rights and hence intended that the Bill become a restraint upon
federal power, not state power. Justice Marshall established
other reasons for the decision based upon an analysis of the
language of several sections of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. While it is possible to refute many of Marshall’s
legal arguments, this momentous decision prevailed as the law
of the land until 1868. From 1833 until 1868, the Bill of Rights
was a dead letter as far as restraining state power was con
cerned in the area of civil rights. The adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868 appeared to herald an age when the states
would have to respect the same civil rights standards as the
federal government. The appearance was deceiving.
The concept of “civil rights” had been derived from natural
law political theory, especially as these had been expressed by
Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence.^ The “unalien^Justice Marshall most convincingly established the case for “broad
construction” in McCulloch v, Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
^In the McCulloch Case (Note 2), the Maryland tax on federal bank
notes was struck down.
4“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.”
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able rights” which Jefferson extolled were those guarantees
and safeguards without which man could not fulfill his essential
humanity. Since the Creator must have intended his Creatures
to be fulfilled in their essential destiny, it was presumed that
these rights had divine origin. These rights were not created
by the state, but it was the duty of the state to ensure their
protection. The Bill of Rights had incorporated the most vital
safeguards for the fulfillment of human development. For
example, without the freedoms of expression grounded in the
First Amendment, man could not communicate and develop his
rational faculties. Without the Fourth Amendment safeguards
against arbitrary intrusions into his privacy, man could be
subjected to debilitating terror which could arrest his personal
development through the intimidation of the state. Lacking the
guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh, he could be brought
to trial by groundless accusations and pass mute and defense
less into the hands of the state executioner.
Th ese safeguards of the Bill of Rights were equivalent with
the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”
which sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment wrote into that
addition to the supreme law of the land. The Fourteenth Amend
ment was a “Civil War amendment” designed to give the federal
government the Constitutional power to compel the states to
respect the most basic human rights. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states were forbidden to make or enforce any
law abridging such privileges and immunities. The Amendment
further provides: “...nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”^
While there has been considerable controversy concerning
the matter, there can be little doubt that the sponsors of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended it to overcome the results of
Barron v. Baltimore and to compel the states to respect the
standards of the Bill of Rights. The “father” of the Fourteenth
Amendment “privileges and immunities” and “due process”
^Amendment Fourteen, Section 1: “All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”
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clauses was Congressman John Bingham of Ohio. Bingham
guided the drafting of these clauses in committee and inter
preted them in the floor' debate in the House on February 26,
1866. Bingham remarked: “Is the Bill of Rights to stand in our
Constitution hereafter, as in the past five years within the
eleven States, a mere dead letter? It is absolutely essential
that it be enforced... Gentlemen who oppose this amendment
opposed the grant of power to enforce the Bill of Rights....
The view that the Fourteenth Amendment would apply the
Bill of Rights to the states was also supported by sponsoring
spokesmen in the Senate. Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan
spoke in the Senate on May 23, 1866, of the difficulty of cir
cumscribing the meaning of privileges and immunities under
the Amendment. He saw in the Bill of Rights their minimum
meaning.^
The first major test of Bill of Rights freedoms in their
applicability to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
came in 1873. At issue was a Louisiana statute requiring that
all butchering in the City of New Orleans be done on the pre
mises of a butchering monopoly created by the statute. New
Orleans butchers challenged this statute on the basis that it
deprived them of privileges and immunities of United States
citizenship made explicit in the Bill of Rights and enforceable
upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.^
In these suits consolidated as the Slaughterhouse Cases,
the Supreme Court repudiated the thesis that the Fourteenth
Amendment, through its “privileges or immunities” clause,
could apply the Bill of Rights to the states. To do so, M.
Justice Miller contended, “would constitute this court a per
petual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil
rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it
did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed
at the time of the adoption of this amendment.”^ He observed
further that the acceptance of the thesis by the court would
“radically” change “the whole theory of the relations of the
State and Federal governments to each other and of both these
governments to the people....” Announcing the decision of the
court. Miller stated: “We are convinced that no such results
^Adamson v. California, 91 L. Ed. 1933 (1947).

7/feia'., 91 L. Ed. 1937, 1938.
^Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wallace 36 (1873).
21 L, Ed. 409,
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were intended by the Congress which proposed these amend
ments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified
them.”
If “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”
did not include the safeguards of the Bill of Rights, it was a
fair question as to what they did include. M. Justice Miller felt
impelled to suggest some of their content. Such privileges and
immunities would include the right to navigate the navigable
waters of the United States without state restraints or to have
the protection of the federal government while abroad. They
would also include voting rights secured hy the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments as well as restrictions against servitude
under the Thirteenth. Justice Miller failed to include any of the
substantial and basic rights of the Bill of Rights.
From this view, M. Justice Field disserted as a minority
voice on the court. Justice Field commented that if the Congress
had been of Justice Miller’s view, then the Fourteenth Amend
ment was “a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished
nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the
people on its passage.”!®
There could hardly be a more naked example of disregard
for the intent of those who proposed and those who adopted a
constitutional provision.!! But this was not the end of the
question. While the Supreme Court had nullified the imposition
of the Bill of Rights upon the states through the “privileges or
immunities” clause, there was still the “due process” clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It provided that no state could
“deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.” Could the denial of protections under the Bill of Rights
be a deprivation of “liberty” without “due process of law” as
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment? This was a fair ques
tion, and an important one if a last-ditch effort were to succeed
to prevent the emasculation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The test of the “due process clause” as a vehicle for
applying the Bill of Rights to the states came in 1884. In the
case of Hurtado v. California, the Supreme Court was asked to
overturn a capital penalty on the basis that the conviction did
not proceed from a grand jury indictment as the Fifth Amendment
of the Bill of Rights prescribes. Hurtado’s counsel argued that
l^lbid., 21 L. Ed. 415.
!!C. Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution (New York, 1959),
p. 556.
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the “due process of law” required of the states in the Foui^
teenth Amendment included the procedural requirements of the
Bill of Rights, in this case, grand jury indictment.
M. Justice Matthews, speaking for the Supreme Court, over
ruled this defense and repudiated the thesis that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to apply the
procedural aspects of the Bill of Rights to the states. Due
process of law, he asserted, was simply an old concept of the
common law requiring a hearing before condemnation, orderly
and fair inquiry, and trial before judgment.
While indictment
by grand jury might further the purposes of due process. Justice
Matthews did not regard it as essential. Essential fairness
could proceed from other means of indictment such as the
“information” indictment used by California, a system whereby
the prosecutor alone, unaided by a grand jury, decided which
cases should be tried.
While it is not difficult to refute the legal arguments which
Justice Matthews used to buttress the position of the court, ^
the Hurtado decree, along with the Slaughterhouse decision
discussed above, placed the states beyond the restrictions of
the Bill of Rights in direct contravention of the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment sponsors. From this point it appeared
that the states were as free to ignore the Bill of Rights as they
had been in 1833 when the Supreme Court permitted the City of
Baltimore to silt Mr. Barron’s wharf without compensation. The
Fourteenth Amendment in 1884 did truly appear to be a “vain
and idle enactment.” It was at the point of perishing as was
Mr. Hurtado.
While the Slaughterhouse and Hurtado decisions continue to
be binding precedents in civil rights suits against state offi
cials, vigorous judicial debate about those decisions has
continued since 1884. In a case in 1908 determining whether the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination must be
respected by the states, M. Justice Moody said the following
for the court:
Criticism of the [Slaughterhouse Cases] has never
entirely ceased, nor has it ever received universal assent
by members of this Court. Undoubtedly, it gave much less
effect to the Fourteenth Amendment than some of the
^^Hurtado v, California, 28 L. Ed. 238 (1884).
l^See Justice Harlan’s dissent in Hurtado v. California, 28 L. Ed.
239-246 (1884).
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public men active in framing it intended, and disappointed
many others. On the other hand, if the views of the min
ority had prevailed it is easy to see how far the authority
and independence of the states would have been dimi
nished, by subjecting all their legislative and judicial
acts to correction by the legislative and review by the
judicial branch of the National Government. But we need
not now inquire into the merits of the original dispute.
This part at least of the Slaughterhouse Cases has been
steadily adhered to by this Court. 14
More recently, in 1947, M. Justice Frankfurter said much the
same concerning attempts to equate the “privileges or immuni
ties clause’’ of the Fourteenth Amendment with the Bill of
Rights. Justice Frankfurter rejected the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment sponsors because of “the mischievous uses to
which that clause would lend itself if its scope were not con
fined to that given it....’’l^
It is evident that the defense of the Slaughterhouse and
Hurtado decisions rested on political rather than judicial
grounds. They are justified as necessary strategies in resis
tance to the Reconstruction program of the Congress as the
Congress attempted to use the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce
civil rights in the South. This was judicial politics of consider
able magnitude. The civil rights situation nearly reverted
to 1833.
In the case of Twining v. New Jersey (1908), M. Justice
Moody, while shunning the privileges or immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, nonetheless suggested, contrary to
the Hurtado decision, that the due process clause of the Four
teenth Amendment could make some provisions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states. Justice Moody suggested the
possibility that “some of the personal rights safeguarded by
the first eight Amendments against National action may also be
safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them
would be a denial of due process of law.’’ He stated that many
of these were “of such a nature that they are included in the
conception of due process of law.’’^®
wining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 96 (1908).
l^Adamson v, California, 91 L. Ed. 1914 (1947).
l^Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 99 (1908).
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While the Supreme Court continued to deny that the Four*
teenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states, aggrieved appellants alleging arbitrary abuse by state
governments continued to re-open the question each term the
Supreme Court sat. The court soon found itself Involved in the
process of accepting some items of the Bill of Rights and
rejecting others as being applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. This was sometimes referred to as
**judicial inclusion and exclusion.”Those items which were
accepted by the court were said to have been ‘‘absorbed
within the “liberty” protected by the due process clause of the
amendment. By 1925 the court had determined that the freedoms
of expression and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment
of the Bill of Rights could be applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.!^ This determination made it possible
for the Supreme Court to strike down numerous state and local
statutes restricting the freedom of speech and the freedom of
the press. 20 It also enabled the court to review and decide
suits arising out of state legislation requiring prayer and Bible
reading in the public schools in 1962 and 1963.21
Apart from “First Amendment freedoms” which the states
must now respect, several other important provisions of the
Bill of Rights have been ‘‘absorbed” by the Fourteenth Amend
ment. Quite significantly the Supreme Court, in a case-by-case
adjudication, has determined that the Bill of Rights safeguards
against arbitrary arresti false accusation, and unfair trial pro
cedures must apply to state jurisdictions. That the state must
inform the accused of the nature and cause of an accusation
and, with certain modifications, allow the accused to confront
witnesses against him and have compulsory process for ob
taining witnesses in his favor—these Sixth Amendment protec
tions must now be respected by the states. Such protections
were most uncertain in 1884. In the last few years the Supreme
Davidson v. New Orleans, 9, U.S. 104 (1878).
18s ee the opinion of Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 324, 325 (1937).
^^Citlow V. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
^^Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
^^Engel V, Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School District oj Abington
Township v, Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Court has been requiring the states to move ever closer to Bill
of Rights standards in due process questions.^2 And in a very
significant case coming from Ohio, the Supreme Court decided
in 1961 that the states must adhere to the Fourth Amendment
restrictions upon arbitrary searches and seizures in the same
manner that the federal government is bound.
It has been shown that by 1884 the Supreme Court had frus
trated Congressional attempts to reverse Barron v. Baltimore.
The Fourteenth Amendment was denied sufficient potency to
apply the Bill of Rights to the states. However, through several
decades of case-by-case adjudication, many of the most essen
tial items of the Bill of Rights were held binding upon the
states, some within the last few years. While the effects of the
case involving Barron’s wharf have been largely overcome, the
Fourteenth Amendment leaves the states slightly less restrained
by Bill of Rights provisions, than is the federal government. In
one respect, however, the Fourteenth Amendment opened an area
of freedom which the Bill of Rights had not fully anticipated.
While the Barron decision had an invidious effect upon civil
rights, it did influence the passage of the Fourteenth Amend
ment which includes the very potent “equal protection clause.”
States are forbidden to deny persons within their jurisdiction
“equal protection of the laws.” It is this clause which em
powered the Supreme Court to declare public school segregation
unconstitutional.^'^ There is no doubt that states may not support
or lend their sanction to discriminatory practices related to
race, national origin or religion. It was doubtful, however,
whether this equal protection clause could be used to forbid
discrimination by private businesses. The issue arose in con
nection with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The Reconstruction Congress attempted to outlaw private
discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1875. That statute
included a section stating the following;
Sec. 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
22This is especially true with respect to the rights of the accused in
criminal proceedings. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23Mapp V. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
^^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
^^Congressional Quarterly V/eekly Report, No. 7, 1964, (Washington,
“
D.C., 1964).
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and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement;
subject only to the conditions and limitations established
by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.26
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court decided
that the Fourteenth Amendment “equal protection clause”
applied only to governmental discrimination. This section of
the Civil Rights Act was held unconstitutional. However, the
court observed that the equal portection clause could be invoked
if there was “State action through its officers or agents...
adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment....” The court stated that the equal
protection clause could not prevent the wrongful acts of indivi
duals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws,
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act
of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a
private wrong....”2^
While the Supreme Court in 1883 slammed the door on the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, the court’s opinion suggested an
alternative route. It added some crucial phrases which provide
the foundation for the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court observed
in the Civil Rights Cases:
Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in
which Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers
of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with
an express of implied denial of such power to the States,
as in the regulation of commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, ... In these cases Congress
has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects speci
fied in every detail, and the conduct and transaction of
individuals in respect thereof. 28
As with the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Act of 1964 con
tinues to prohibit state-supported private discrimination. But,
seizing upon the invitation presented by the Supreme Court of
1883, the draftsmen of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exploited
the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce as a
means of effectuating prohibitions of discrimination in public
accommodations when such discrimination is based upon ques
tions of race, religion, color or creed. Among its provisions,
the act forbids discrimination by hotels and motels serving
28c!t>i7 Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 9 (1883).
27/fe,rf., 109 U.S. 9, 11, 17, 18.
28/fe,v., 109 U.S. 18.
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interstate travelers, or by establishments serving food, etc.
moving in interstate commerce.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitu
tion is the “commerce clause.” It authorizes Congress “To
regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Under Article I, Section 10,
Clause 2, the states are forbidden to place any burdens upon
interstate commerce. Hence, the power of Congress over inter
state commerce is said to be “plenary.” That the commerce
clause of the Constitution would serve as a convenient vehicle
for the assertion of federal power over matters of apparent state
or local concern was obvious long before the turn of the century.
It is the basis of an enormous amount of federal regulatory
legislation, including the Taft-Hartley Act, a piece of legisla
tion which states-rights advocates seldom criticize. Since the
1930’s the Supreme Court has indicated in numerous decisions
that Congressional power over interstate commerce, coupled
with the constitutional prohibition of state authority in this area,
would justify Congressional supervision of commercial transac
tion which had an effect, or at least a “substantial effect,”
upon the flow of interstate commerce.
While it might have been doubted that Congress could assert
its authority over interstate commerce to prohibit discrimination
by hotels, restaurants and the like, the doubt was resolved in
two unanimous opinions of the United States Supreme Court
on Decern ber 14, 1964.^^ In the case involving the Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc., the parties admitted that the motel engaged
in national advertising and that 75% of its registered guests
were from out of state. The motel admitted that it had refused
lodging to transient Negroes because of their race. All parties
agreed that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been violated. This
case presented a test of the constitutionality of the law. While
relying upon more recent decisions, the Supreme Court empha
sized Justice Marshall’s words in the basic commerce clause
case. Gibbons v. Ogden, decided in 1824. In this leading
opinion. Justice Marshall asserted that the power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce “is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitation,
other than are prescribed in the constitution....”^9
^^Supreme Court of the United States, Individual Slip Opinions,
No. 515, October Term, 1964, Atlanta Motel v. United States; No.
543, Katzenbach v. McClung.
^^Ibid., Atlanta Motel v. United States, p. 13.
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While the operation of the Heart of Atlanta Motel might be
viewed as a local and intrastate operation not subject to Con
gressional authority, the court asserted Congress’ right, as it
so often has,31 to regulate the local incidents of commerce
which affect interstate commerce. The Atlanta Motel decision
was supported by the following comments from the court:
Thus the powerof Congress to promote interstate commerce
also includes the power to regulate the local incidents
thereof, including local activities in both the States of
origin and destination, which might have a substantial
and harmful effect uporf that commerce.32
In the companion case involving Ollie’s Barbecue, there was
no showing that the customers were interstate travelers. How
ever, it was shown that 46% of the meat served by Ollie McClung
was derived from out of state, thus invoking Civil Rights Act
provisions prohibiting a restaurant to discriminate if “a sub
stantial portion of the food which it serves” has moved in
interstate commerce.33

The United States cannot escape its heritage of liberty even
though this heritage has been resisted by those Americans who
have bequeathed a ‘‘legacy of suppression.”34 A nation which
continues to boast of ‘‘liberty and justice for all” can hardly
become permanently forgetful of those unalienable rights pro
claimed by Jefferson to be ‘‘self-evident” and made concrete in
the Bill of Rights. When Barron’s silted wharf presented an
occasion for the Supreme Court to announce that the states were
immune from that standard of liberty, the door opened for state
jurisdictions to vary and suppress the standards of justice to a
scandalous degree. While it may be true that there was more
than Jeffersonian libertarianism behind the sponsorship of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that instrument was sufficiently just
and explicit in its design to overcome the difficulties created by
the Barron decision. The Supreme Court took the lead in origi
nally rendering that amendment nugatory. But the persistent
claims raised before that body for an honest application of the
^^National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Corp,, 301
U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby Lumber Co,, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); V/ickard v, Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
32See Note 29, Atlanta Motel v. United States, pp. 16, 17.
33See Note 29, Katzenbach v. McClung.
34cf. Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression (Cambridge, Mass
achusetts, 1960).
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amendment have brought about a series of decisions which have
gradually compelled the states to accept Bill of Rights stand
ards. Today a state action which strays from Bill of Rights
standards may be reversed by a federal court on the grounds
that it violates the “due process clause” of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The “equal protection clause” of the Fourteenth
Amendment adds a measure of protection which the language of
the Bill of Rights did not make quite so clear. To this extent,
the Barron decision perhaps influenced a widening of liberties.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 stands at the end of an impres
sive series of legislative acts designed to vindicate the Jeffer
sonian theory of government. While its basic features were
earlier enacted in the subsequently-nullified Civil Rights Act
of 1875, the drafters of the present law took care to avoid the
frailties of the 1875 legislation.
All these efforts of government would of course be unneces
sary if our people were in accord with the respect for human
dignity championed by the constitutional founders. It borders on
the absurd to base one’s right to be served in a restaurant on
the percentage of meat which the proprietor buys from out of
state. Apparently the ideals supported by the Bill of Rights are
not as “self-evident” as Jefferson supposed. The Supreme
Court in recent years has tried to remind the nation of this
tradition by generously quoting the documentary basis of this
tradition in its decisions. It is self-evident that our educational
system has not produced a sufficient awareness of the rationale
for liberty which makes civil liberty preferable to authoritarian
ism and despotism.
© 1965, by John H. Laubach
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GOETHE - DISCOVERER OF THE ICE-AGE 1
by
Dorothy Cameron
No, I do not fear the reproach, that a contradiction led
me from the contemplation of the human heart, that
youngest and most fickle creature of creation, to the
observation of rock, the oldest and most unshakeable part
of nature, for you must admit, that all natural things exist
in an exact connection.
Thus wrote Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in his essay, “Granite.”
That Goethe was one of the world’s greatest poets is wellknown. It is less well-known that he was a scientist, a geolo
gist, and that among his achievements he was one of the first to
attribute tbe transport of erratic blocks to glaciers and to believe
that an ice-sheet covered northern Germany. Furthermore, he
was the very first to believe in an ice-age. Jean de Charpentier
in his Essai sur Les Glaciers not only credited Goethe with
antedating him in his opinion that alpine erratics were trans
ported by glaciers,2 but also prefaced his great work with that
paragraph from Wilhelm Meister which presented Goethe s
theories of glacial transport and the ice-age. Louis Agassiz —
whose paper “Discours sur Vanciene extension des Glaciers, ’
presented to the Societe helvetique des sciences naturelles on
July 24, 1837, is considered to be tbe first scientific exposition
of the theory — stated his debt to Goethe: “In respect to the
theory of the ice-age, it can be found most clearly from Goethe
what I learned later.... Goethe alone unified all the indications
into a definitive theory.”2 Agassiz based his statement, perhaps
partially upon Wilhelm Meister, but more upon Goethe’s seven
geological fragments; “Von Hoff’s Geological Work” written in
1823, and “Geological Problems,” “Cold,” “Rock Formation,”
“Scattered Granite,” “Erratics,” and “Ice-Age,” all written in
1829 and 1830. While the glacial and ice-age theories presented
in these essays are essentially the same, Goethe was casual
and ambiguous about the details.
iReprinted from the Journal of Glaciology by courtesy of the Glaciological Society.
^Lausanne, 1841, p.v. All translations of foreign works are mine.
®Kurt Hildebrandt, Goethes Naturerkenntnis (Hamburg-Bergedorf,
1947), p. 307; also Gunter Schmid, forward to Goethe as a Scientist,
by Rudolf Magnus (New York, 1949), p. xvii.
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First he discusses the erratics lying on the North German
Plain, offering the various, often bizzare explanations accepted
by others at that time:
They might have been pushed by means of great pressures
from inside the earth, through the crust into the air,
splintering where they fell. {Wilhelm lAeister)
They might have slid to their present positions when the
mountains suddenly rose. (“Geological Problems”)
Then he presents his own theory of transport by an ice-sheet:
The blocks were carried by the ice-sheets. (“Von Hoff’s
Geological Work”)
Big ice-rafts still carry granite blocks in the Baltic.
(“Scattered Granite”)
Although Goethe clearly preferred the theory of ice transport
of erratics, he erred when he did not completely rule out other
possible causes for the blocks. Specifically, the blocks might
have been remains of an old mountain range which weathered
away. He also erred in his belief in a floating ice-sheet rather
than land ice. In Wilhelm Meister he indicated the drift theory.
But in his geological fragments he envisioned something more
in accord with present-day theory: a period of great cold, during
which Germany lay under an ice-sheet. Then, the ice-rafts that
had been jammed together and frozen into the ice-sheet, melted
with the ice-sheet. The melting action, plus storms, drove the
granite-laden ice-rafts toward the south where the granite was
finally deposited. Goethe was guided in his thinking by Johann
C. W. Voigt, Counselor of Mines at Illmenau. At first, Goethe
treated the idea as a joke but later adopted the theory, after
hearing confirmation from other sources. It was not generally
accepted that North Germany had lain under an ice-sheet until
many years later, with Otto Torell’s paper in 1875. Acceptance
was unusually slow because there were few striated surfaces,
and no high mountains from where the ice could have come'^ —
the only clues were the erratics. Thus Goethe was among the
first to envision an ice-sheet of continental dimensions and to
realize that this ice carried and deposited material.
Goethe was more explicit when he discussed the erratics in
the vicinity of the Lake of Geneva:
The glaciers travel through the valleys to the edge of the
lake carrying the granite blocks loosed from above, as
still happens today. The blocks remain on the lake plain
after the ice melts, to be found today, unrounded, because
they were brought there smoothly, and not forcefully.
(“Erratics”)
^J. K. Charlesworth, The Quaternary Era (London, 1957), p. 627.
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Goethe was unclear about the actual means of transportation of
the boulders. In Wilhelm Meister, he wrote erroneously that they
slid to their present positions on the ice. In “Ice-Age.” “Geo
logical Problems,” “Erratics,” and “Rock Formation” he
correctly states that the advancing ice pushed and carried the
debris. He also stated this in conversation. Although it is
entirely possible that Goethe based his conclusions upon the
earlier work of Ignace Venetz, a Swiss engineer, Goethe s
writings, letters, and conversations — scrupulously recorded —
contain no reference either to Venetz or to Playfair, whose
work was unknown in Germany and Switzerland at this time. It
is more probable that he reached his conclusions independently.
He had gained extensive knowledge when he visited Switzerland,
several times making geological observations and conversing
with local scientists. Others before him — namely, J. C. Altmann
in 1751, G. S. Gruner in 1806, and before them, the alpine
peasants^ — had known about the glacial transport of erratics.
So, although Goethe was among the first, he was by no means
the originator of this theory. None of these other men, however,
carried the glacial theory to its logical conclusion: that for ice
to form, for a continental ice-sheet to move, there must have
been a period of great cold, an ice-age, a glacial epoch. Goethe
deduced:
There must have been an epoch of great cold. (“Geological
Problems”)
For so much ice to exist, cold is needed. I suspect that
there was an epoch of great cold in Europe. (“Cold”)
...a period of intense cold. {Wilhelm Meister)
It is here that Goethe was a true pioneer. Even Charpentier did
not believe in an ice-age, but rather in a greater extension of
the glaciers. It demanded high intelligence to observe the
phenomena, evaluate the varying reports, and be correct con
cerning the North German and the Swiss erratics. However, to
deduce from these separate occurrences that there must have
been an epoch of great cold, an ice-age, demanded, at this
early date of 1829-1830, genius.
Why was Goethe never credited except by Charpentier and
Agassiz? The scientific “authorities” had previously refused to
recognize Goethe as a man of science. His discovery of the
inter-maxillary bone, his studies of plant metamorphosis, his
theory of colors — all were rejected and ridiculed. Never again
^Ibid., p. 623.
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did he dare to propose a scientific theory seriously; never again
did he systematically experiment and record his findings. He
never properly presented his theories of ice transport of erratics,
of the continental ice-sheet, of the ice-age. They are buried in
the midst of a rambling novel, haphazardly and depreciatingly
presented in seven geological fragments. Abuse of his scientific
offerings had made Goethe sarcastic.. After correctly observing
that big ice-rafts still traverse the Baltic carrying granite, he
added: “But that is a case for the customs authorities in
Gothenburg.” Thus Goethe’s theories were never widely known.
That a philosopher, a poet, should be the first to conceive of
the ice-age theory (the term ice-age was coined in 1837 by
another scientist-poet, Karl Schimper; Goethe always used the
term epoch of great cold), is not so strange as it first appears.
To deduce such a sweeping concept from observations of
isolated phenomena, one must share with Goethe his philosophi
cal belief in the harmony of nature. It is necessary to connect
the various manifestations into a coherent whole, into universal
law. It is necessary to see that “all things exist in an exact
connection.” This could very well be impossible for a scientist
who, learned in his own field, lacked the vision of an allencompassing nature. Another concept of Goethe’s which would
aid in his formulation of an ice-age theory was his belief in the
slow development of the earth. The earth was, in fact, still
developing; there was a continual ‘becoming’ and passing,
deposition and ablation, crystallization and weathering. Goethe
wrote in Faust: “Nature and her living results were never
alloted a certain amount of time. Each form is built regularly,
and even the great is achieved without violence.”^ Thus the
concept of vast ages of time in which the climate could slowly
change, and in turn, wring changes, would be a logical deduc
tion. On the other hand, the scientist who believed that changes
were wrought quickly — by sudden earthquake, a rain of meteor
ites, a flood, a rising of mountain ranges — even had he correctly
assumed, in this case, that erratics had been deposited by
glaciers, would be unable to carry the glacial theory to its
logical conclusion: namely, the theory of the ice-age.
Agassiz and Charpentier are correct when they assign to
Goethe the credit for being the first to have conceived the
theory of the ice-age. To Goethe the scientist, as well as to
^Werke (1957), 1, 903, 11. 7861-64.
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f
Goethe the poet, science and artistic creation were but two
manifestations of nature’s all-encompassing law. In Goethe’s
own words, “What the scientist carefully collects ... the
philosopher unifies. ...thus it becomes comprehensible and
usuable.’’^
^“Hypothese ueber die Erdbildung,’’ V/erke (Weimar, 1892), LX, 205.
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THE LASER: A NEW OPTICAL RESEARCH TOOL
by
Philip E. Barnhart
The principle of the operation of lasers has been known and
understood for many years. It is perhaps one of the paradoxes
of modern physics that man had only recently put the knowledge
to use in view of the basic simplicity of operation and extremely
wide application that results from laser action.
A laser (an acronym tor Light Amplification by Stimulated
Emission of Radiation) is a device based upon the processes of
interaction between radiation, such as light or radio waves, and
atoms or molecules. The product of a laser is coherent light, a
commodity available in only limited quantities until now. Mass
production of coherent light opens the door to the solutions of
many problems of physical science.
The laser is not a “death ray” as described in some popular
publications. If handled in a careless way a laser beam can do
bodily harm just as the light from the sun, if not treated with
proper respect, can damage the human organism.
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This report is an attempt to describe the fundamental theories
upon which the operation of the laser is based, some of the
characteristics of the output beam of a laser, a few of the uses
to which a laser may be applied, and the advantages of using a
laser as a teaching aid and research tool in the physics labora
tory.
Quantum Theory of Atomic Radiation
According to the classical view of an electron orbiting about
a heavy nucleus, the atom should radiate like a miniature radio
antenna because the electrically charged electron is being
continually accelerated. The natural result of such a state of
affairs would be the eventual collapse of all atoms as they lose
energy in the form of radiation.
Emission of radiant energy takes place when an atom passes
from a level of higher energy to a level of lower energy. Absorp
tion of energy results when there is a transition from a lower
level to a higher one caused by extraction of energy from
radiation or some other source of energy in the environment of
the atom.
The fact that atoms do not show this predicted instability led
Niels Bohr to a new interpretation of atomic structure based
upon theoretical work of Max Planck and Albert Einstein. In this
picture electrons may not possess arbitrary energies when bound
to a nucleus but may be found only in discrete, fixed energy
states determined by the newly discovered wave characteristics
of very small particles. An atom can then absorb or emit radia
tion in bundles, or quanta, containing just enough energy to
cause the electron to go from one discrete energy level to
another.
A quantitative description of the behavior of an atom was
first presented in theory by Einstein, a result of his early work
on the photoelectric effect. When an atom changes its energy
state, it always involves an energy transfer determined by the
discrete energy states occupied by the atom before and following
the transition. When light is involved as the agent of transport
of the energy, Einstein and Planck describe a quantum of light
energy (a photon) equivalent in energy to the difference in
energy of the two states between which the atom had undergone
a transition. This energy was shown to be expressable as a
constant, h, (called Planck’s Constant) times the frequency, f,
of the light wave involved. In other words we may express the
quantum nature of light directly in terms of the fundamental
process from which it originated. Expressed in the notation of
the physicist:
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hf =E2- El
The left hand side of this equation describes the quantum of
energy associated with a photon of light while the right hand
side describes the change undergone by the atom to produce this
photon of light.

hf 20
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hf 10
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(2)

I
Eo

i
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Figure 1
The allowed energy transitions from the first excited level of a threelevel atom: 1) Spontaneous emission wherein the excited atom gives
up energy of excitation in the form of a light photon; 2) Absorption of
energy in the form of a photon of the energy radiation in the environ
ment of the atom; 3) Stimulated emission induced by an environmental
photon.

Let us represent the allowed energy states in an idealized
atom as in Figure 1. Einstein described three ways in which an
atom in the energy state Eq can leave the state. First, if there
is no external source of energy available to the atom it cannot
move from state Eq to a higher state E2. However, there is a
finite probability that the atom will spontaneously {i.e. without
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any external influence) jump from level, E]^ to Eq with the
emission of energy hfio=Ei-Eo. This is expressed by the
Einstein coefficient A(1,0) which is the probability^ A(1,0) that
in unit time the atom will undergo a spontaneous downward
transition from Ej to Eg with the emission of energy. If the
number of atoms in the state Ej is N]^, then the number of
transitions per second would be given by:
N(Per second) = A(l,0)Ni.
From the coefficient A(1,0) it is also possible to determine the
lifetime of a single atom in a given energy state.^ These times
range from about one billionth second to about one thousandth
second.
There are two things which can happen to an atom in energy
state Ej if the atom is in the presence of radiation or light. If a
photon of light of frequency f2i such that hf2l E2 - Ej arrives
at the atom while it is in the state E}, the photon may be
absorbed by the atom and appear as an increase in the energy
content of the atom. Transitions from Ej to E2 will take place
at a rate proportional to the number of atoms in the lower level,
Ni, and to, I(f2l)> the intensity of the radiation of the proper
energy, hf2l. This rate will be given by:
N(per second)=

I(f2l) B (1,2)

where B(l,2) is the Einstein coefficient of absorption appro
priate to those two levels. This phenomenon corresponds to the
familiar property of atoms which produces a dark line absorption
spectrum such as that of the sun.
iThe laws of probability control many factors in the physical
world. For instance in rolling one die (of a pair of dice) each face has
equal probability of landing upward. As there are six faces, during a
single roll each face has one chance in six of being the one which
lands up. The probability that a given face will appear up is 1/6 while
the probability of any face landing up is 1.0 (assuming a fair game).
The probability of rolling a 7 with one die is zero.
The Einstein coefficients simply state the probability that an atom
in a given situation will accomplish one of a number of events within a
given time interval. It is much like asking the probability that upon
rolling a single die once each second a 2 will land up in one second.
2ln general, the lifetime of a “non-2” roll of a single die will be
longer than the lifetime of a “non-even” roll because of the smaller
probability of a "2” occuring in a unit time. The same holds true for
atoms. Those having small Einstein coefficients (low probability of
occurring in a given time) will have long lifetimes. Those with large
Einstein coefficients will have a short lifetime.
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A less familiar event occurs when a photon of frequency fj^Q
(i.e., an energy corresponding to the difference between the
excited state Ejand the state Eq, below El) falls upon the atom
while it is in the excited state El- The likelihood of its cas
cading to level Eq is increased over the spontaneous emission
coefficient by an amount also depending upon the intensity of
the incident light. Thus a coefficient of INDUCED EMISSION or
STIMULATED EMISSION is defined so that the number of
induced emissions of atoms from level El to Eq per unit time
N’ (per second) = NiKfio) B(1,0).
The total rate of depopulation of the state Ei is given by the
sum of the rates of these three processes:
N(per second) = NiA(l,0)+NiI(f2l)B(12)+NiI(flo)B(l,0).
It is significant to note that the radiation produced by spon
taneous emission is emitted in random directions while that
produced by the process of stimulated emission leaves the atom
in the same direction as the incident radiation and in exact
phase with it.
Population Inversion and Laser Action
Two conditions are necessary to achieve laser action. One
condition is that of population inversion in which there are more
atoms in a particular excited state than there are in some lower
state. The second necessary condition is that some method be
devised for feedback or regeneration of the stimulating radiation
to produce a large number of photons at the laser frequency in
order to assure that the atoms in the excited state be stimulated
to emit before they have an opportunity to revert spontaneously
to a lower energy level with the resulting emission of a random
incoherent photon. Their two requirements will be described in
terms of the following idealized model.
Let us examine what occurs in a system of very many atoms
with allowed energy levels Eq, E]^ and E2. We will call Eq (the
level of lowest energy in which the atom can be found) the
Ground State. In ordinary gases at room temperature, and in the
absence of radiation, practically all atoms will be in the ground
state. The excited levels E]^ and E2 will only occasionally be
populated when an atom gathers enough thermal energy to bump
one of its neighbors into the higher state. Such transfer of
mechanical energy into the excitation of atoms is described as
collisional excitation.
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Photons of light corresponding to the energy (E][ - Eq)
incident upon such a gas will tend to be absorbed, thereby
raising atoms to the excited state Ej. In general the greater the
number of incident photons available tbe greater will be the
number of atoms raised to the excited state. Two factors serve
to limit the population of the excited level — spontaneous emis
sion and stimulated emission. In the limit, regardless of the
number of incident photons of the appropriate frequency, not
more than 50% of the atoms can be forced into the excited state.
This arises because tbe incident photons are just as likely to
stimulate excited atoms to revert to the ground state as they are
to cause ground state atoms to become excited. Therefore, popu
lation inversion, the condition where more atoms exist in the
excited state Ej than in the ground state Eq cannot be achieved
in such a system.
Population inversion can be accomplished if the atom in its
excited state E2 can relax to its ground state by first undergoing
a transition to Ej and then from E]^ to Eq. This would result in
the emission of two photons of light amounting in total energy to
the single photon of energy hf20 required to excite the atom from
the ground state to the second excited level, E2. Finally if the
Einstein coefficient of spontaneous emission is much smaller
for the level E} than for E2, say by a factor of 1,000 or more
the lifetime of a typical atom in state Ej will be much greater
than in state E2.
Now if a beam of light consisting of photons of energy hf20
is directed into such a system, many of the atoms will be raised
to the state E2. In a short time interval these atoms will spon
taneously make a transition to state E]^. Photons of energy hf20
are not capable of stimulating the emission from level E]^
because they do not have the appropriate frequency, fjQ. There
fore, due to the long lifetime for spontaneous emission the
population of this level increases. If the incident beam is made
sufficiently intense over a long period of time, atoms initially
excited from state Eq to E2 will accumulate in level Ej to the
extent that the population of this level will exceed that of the
ground state; and population inversion will be achieved.
If photons of energy hf^Q are now made incident upon the
system where the population of the level Ej is inverted with
respect to Eq, stimulated emission will exceed absorption and
more photons hf^Q will leave the system than entered it. This
gives rise to the term photon- or quantum-amplification.
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We have thus fulfilled the first condition to achieve laser
action. When our system is in a condition where light amplifica
tion is possible, laser action can be achieved if we can then
provide a suitably intense source of the precise frequency for
stimulating emission from the long lived state, Ej, as well as
cause photon amplification to build up to very high values so
that the state Ej can be depopulated as rapidly as possible.
Both these conditions may be met quite simply by enclosing
the system of excited atoms within an optical cavity. The action
of the optical cavity is as follows. The ends of a narrow
cylindrical enclosure (such an enclosure may be a ruby rod,
rare earth glass or a gas-filled hollow glass tube) are made
highly reflecting at the frequency f^Q at which the laser action
is to be obtained. For a gas laser these end mirrors are most
conveniently made of spherical mirrors so mounted that the focal
points of the two mirrors coincide at the center of the cavity.
The significant property of such a pair of con-focally mounted
mirrors is that any radiation tending to approach the end of the
cavity slightly off axis is reflected back toward the center of
the cavity. Because the mirrors are highly reflecting at the
laser frequency, most of the photons generated by the stimulated
emission within the cavity are trapped and caused to reflect
back and forth within the cavity capable of stimulating more and
more excited atoms to emit at the laser frequency. This trapping
of the radiation in a narrow column between two mirrors and the
inner surface of the cavity assures the production of a narrow
beam of coherent (that quality of a stimulated photon to travel in
the same direction and same phase as the stimulating photon)
radiation traveling in both directions down the cavity.
Most reflecting surfaces can not be made perfectly reflecting,
and the end mirrors of a gas laser will transmit about 1% of the
laser frequency which falls upon it. Thus, there appears a beam
out of both ends of the laser tube which diverges slightly be
cause of the slight negative power of the spherical mirror
surface. If a flat mirror is used in place of one spherical mirror
and if the focal point of the other spherical mirror is adjusted to
lie at the reflecting surface of the flat mirror, an optical cavity
will be formed as a folded version of the above system. With
this arrangement a slightly diverging beam will emerge from the
spherical mirror while a non-divergent beam (except for diffrac
tion effects) will emerge from the flat mirror.
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The source of an intense beam of photons of the proper
frequency is self generated by the optical cavity containing the
inverted population atoms. Once the excitation of the long lived
state has begun, some of the excited atoms will begin to emit
photons of energy hfj^Q
they spontaneously undergo the
transition from state E]^ to Eq. Photons from these spontaneous
transitions are emitted in random directions. Those moving
towards the side of the cavity pass through the edge and are
lost. Those moving along the long dimension of the cavity begin
to encounter other atoms still in the excited state, stimulating
them to emit coherent photons in the same direction thus multi
plying the intensity of the beam as they move toward the end of
the cavity. Upon reaching the mirrors, 99 of every 100 photons
incident on the mirrors are reflected back down the axis of the
cavity to stimulate still more excited atoms to emit. Thus, as
long as there remain atoms in the Ej energy state, there will be
a beam of photons moving either way in a single direction to
stimulate them to add coherent photons to this beam. If the
number of available excited atoms should fall below the limit
whereby they can maintain more available photons than are lost
through the end mirrors, the photons in the stimulating beam
will begin to be absorbed by ground state atoms and the light
amplification will cease.
For this reason, in lasers which are excited by radiation
(where f20 is called the pumping frequency) once the lasing
action has started, the long lived level is depopulated at a much
greater rate than the pumping radiation can repopulate it through
the spontaneous emission from level E2. This comes about
because the rate of stimulated emission depends upon the
intensity of the radiation at the critical frequency, and this
intensity is increased tremendously by the photon amplification
in the laser beam. This type of laser therefore emits a relatively
short pulse of very high intensity coherent radiation. Such
pulsed lasers can produce very large energy concentrations into
very small physical spaces.
A continuous lasing action may be obtained through a some
what different method of excitation. In a mixture of helium and
neon gas, pumping action is attained by a system of electrical
excitation by either a radio frequency or a direct current dis
charge.
The neon atoms possess a scheme of energy levels which
may be represented as in Figure 2.
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Figure 2
Population inversion in neon gas is caused by resonant energy transfer
in collisions with helium.

There are many other possible energy levels into which the
neon atom may be elevated but we shall be interested only in
these three states.
The term “forbidden” transition written between the states
Eq and E2 is simply a way of expressing the fact that an atom
in the ground state Eq, subjected to intense radiation of all
frequencies, will absorb a photon corresponding to the energy
hf20' fn other words the Einstein Absorption Coefficient B(02)
is very much smaller than the corresponding coefficient B(01).
Thus the only way to populate E2 by radiation is through the
state Ej with the subsequent absorption of a photon hf2l. We
have demonstrated that population inversion can not be attained
in this way.
By coincidence the energy level E2 of neon has very nearly
the same energy value as an excited state of the helium atom.
This he lium state may be readily excited by electron bombard
ment in an electrical discharge. Indeed some neon atoms may be
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excited to the E2 level by electron impact, but not nearly fast
enough to overpopulate the level E2.
When a helium atom in the state E2 collides with a neon atom
in the ground state, there is a high probability that the energy
contained in the excited helium atom will be transferred to the
neon atom by a process called resonant energy transfer. Such a
collision leaves the helium atom in the ground state and the
neon atom in the excited state, E2.
If the electrical discharge is rapid enough and if there are
more helium atoms than neon atoms in the enclosure, it is
possible to maintain a population inversion in the state E2 with
respect to E]^. In other words neon atoms can be pumped by
collision with excited helium atoms from the ground state to
level E2 faster than they can return to the ground state by
successive transitions from E2 to E]^ and then from E]^ to Eq.
Once the spontaneous emission begins, the photons thus
produced stimulate further emission; and if suitably aligned end
mirrors are provided, a continuous laser beam results.
The intensity of the laser beam once started will be deter
mined by the total number of neon atoms in the state E2. This
number depends upon 1) the rate at which excited helium atoms
encounter neon atoms in the ground state and 2) the rate at
which the state E2 is depopulated by stimulated emission to
level El- At the instant the laser action begins more photons
are being added to the coherent beam by the process of light
amplification within the optical cavity than are being lost from
the cavity. At this time most of the neon atoms will be in the
state E2 because of the rapid pumping rate which produces the
population inversion. When the laser action starts it will build
up the intensity of the stimulating beam until the level E2
becomes somewhat depleted. If no more neon atoms could be
forced from the ground state, the laser action would stop and we
would be left with just a small scale pulsed laser. However,
another event occurs which tends to allow repopulation of the
E2 level. Neon in the state E} may do one of three things to get
out of this level of excitation. It may absorb a photon of energy
hf21 and return to state E2 where it will be stimulated to emit
immediately in a coherent manner without diminishing the over
all intensity of the laser beam. A second alternative would'be a
spontaneous transition to the ground state emitting a photon
hf]^0‘ This then places the neon atom in a position to be raised
by a quick encounter with an excited helium atom to the level
E2 making it again available for stimulated emission at the
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laser frequency. The third alternative would be that the neon
atom would encounter one of the photons hfj^Q
I’® stimulated
to revert to the ground state with the emission of a second
coherent photon of frequency, f^Q- The coherent photons will be
lost to the enclosure because the end mirrors are so coated that
they reflect only photons near the desired laser frequency while
letting all others pass.
Thus the population of state E2 can be maintained at an
average value which is a balance between the intensity of the
laser beam which depopulates the level E2 and the pumping rate
of collisional excitation by the excited helium atoms. This
latter depends upon the rate of production of ground state neon
atoms which depends upon the spontaneous emission by transi
tions from the terminal laser state, E]^. If the pumping rate is
increased by applying more energy to the electrical discharge,
the intensity of the laser beam will increase until the number of
ground state atoms decreases due to the fact that there is a
mean lifetime of atoms in the state E]^ and they can not return
to Eg as fast ais the helium is capable of raising them to state
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Once the laser action has started it will continue as long as
the conditions for laser action are maintained — population
inversion, which is produced by the helium collision process
out of the neon ground state, and an intense beam of radiation of
the proper frequency which is maintained in the optical cavity
formed by the confocal end mirrors. If either of these processes
is interrupted or terminated the lasing action stops.
Applications of Lasers
Very few theoretical or technical developments have stimu
lated the imaginations of scientists as has the laser. Few fields
of technology have grown as rapidly nor in as many directions
as that of light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation.
The process was first proposed in a remarkably prophetic
paper by A. L. Schawlow and C. H. Townes published in the
Physical Review, December 15, 1958. It was first realized in an
operational form by T. II. Vlainman in July 1960, by means of a
ruby rod pumped by a high intensity light from a xenon flash
tube.
Coherenee, the essential property of laser beams is of two
types: spatial and temporal. A wave is spatially coherent over a
time interval if there exists a surface over which the phase of
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the wave is the same at all points. A wave is time coherent at a
very small area on a receiving surface if there exists a periodic
relationship between its amplitude at any one instant and its
amplitude at later instants. Perfect time coherence is an ideal
since it implies perfect monochromaticity, something which is
forbidden by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
Use in many diverse applications is made of the spacial
coherence of laser beams. Opportunities for application of the
very nearly complete temporal coherence, though at present less
frequent, will become more and more apparent as more of these
devices are put to use.
As a result of their spatial coherence, laser beams have a
very small divergence, that is, they are very directional. For
example, a ruby laser beam one quarter inch in diameter at the
source will be about one foot across on a surface ten miles
away. The very best that can be accomplished with an inco
herent source, such as an arc lamp at the focus of a 6 foot
parabolic mirror would be a beam spread over an area nearly a
third of a mile across.
A feature of laser beams which results from the spatial
coherence of the light is the enormous amount of energy that can
be concentrated in the vary narrow wave length range and
geometrical space. A typical ruby laser will produce an output
of about 1 kilowatt. This power is contained in a band of the
spectrum only 0.05 Angstroms wide (about one 50,000th part of
the visible spectrum) and emanates from an area of about 0.2
square centimeters. The corresponding figure for the power out
put of the sun is about 0.01 watt. The laser output is therefore
some 100,000 times more intense. When further allowance is
made for the directional character of the laser beam and the
corresponding fact that the sun emits its energy from a given
element of surface area over a hemisphere, the laser turns out
to be over 5 billion times brighter than an equivalent area of the
sun. It must be emphasized that these enormous factors apply
only to the single extremely narrow band of radiation emitted by
the laser. They are, nevertheless, startling.
Perhaps the most promising potential of lasers comes from
the close approximations to temporal coherence possessed by
the output beam. It is this property which permits the exploita
tion of radio and microwaves for communications. The difference
is that laser frequencies are millions of times higher than radio
frequencies and are therefore capable of transmitting more
infomiation than all existing radio and television channels
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combined. The red emission from a helium - neon laser has a
frequency of 5 x 10^4 cycles per second or 500 million mega
cycles. This frequency has the capability of transmitting over 80
million TV channels. Since the channel width for telephone
communication is only 4 kilocycles per second, the capacity of
a single laser beam is, considering the world’s population,
beyond all our needs. It is conceivable that communications of
the future will rest very heavily on the technology of laser
beams.
Because of the high power concentration of continuous laser
beams it seems leasable to establish an optical radar system
capable of detecting speeds as small as one thirtieth of a
centimeter per second.
In the field of precise measurements the coherent beam from
a gas laser provides a measuring stick with the smallest unit
equal to the wave length of the light constituting the beam.
Differences in separation of two objects of the order of 5 one
hundred thousandths of a centimeter may be detected over
distances of many meters rather than a range of a few centi
meters presently possible with incoherent sources.
Micro-surgery and photo coagulation processes are two
applications of laser technology already accomplished in
medicine.
Industry has found a means for microwelding and micro
cutting. Applications in quality control and measurements are
also wide open fields in manufacturing.
In the research laboratory the laser finds an almost inexhaustable supply of duties and tasks for which it is ideally
suited. Studies of the theory of radiation and the interaction of
radiation with transmitting media become of vital importance.
New tests for scientific theories such as Einstein’s relativity
are made possible. New techniques for guidance systems,
structural analysis and microscopy have presented themselves
to the research scientist.
In large measure the contribution of the laser most important
and most useful will be in the direction of education. A straight
forward application of quantum physics has long been sought to
be used in demonstrations. The existence of a strictly coherent
optical source has heretofore been lacking. Uncomplicated
demonstrations from physical optics can now be made visible to
individuals and to groups. The wide variety of applications
makes possible many meaningful individual projects for the
advanced student. The laser may well find a place in education
rivaling its growing position in industry and communications.
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ALBERT GAMES: TWO ANSWERS TO ABSURDITY
by
William T. Hamilton
At first reading, Camus’s novels The Stranger (1942) and
The Plague (1947) seem to have little in common. The earlier
novel is the story of a depressingly ordinary man who is tried,
and eventually executed, for what seems to be an entirely
pointless murder. The Plague, on the other hand, chronicles
the efforts of a Dr. Rieux and his friends to stem an outbreak of
the disease in Oran. In one book the hero systematically denies
his connection with the rest of humanity; in the other the
characters gradually come to the conclusion that men must
submerge themselves in the common struggle for survival. But
the two novels are not contradictory; instead, they describe
two different answers to the belief that the universe is indif
ferent to man’s wishes. Thus, The Plague is in many respects
the obverse of the coin presented in The Stranger.
Dr. Rieux, the self-effacing hero of The Plague (it is not
until the end of the book that he asserts himself enough to
admit that he is telling the story), and his friend Tarrou pro
vide important contrasts with Mersault, the central character of
The Stranger. Tarrou talks of a vaguely troubled past only
slightly better developed in the story than Mersault’s. On the
surface, Tarrou’s remark that “I’ve little left to learn’’ sounds
quite as world-weary as Mersault’s observation that ambition is
“pretty futile.’’ Both are disillusioned. But the depths of the
disillusionment as well as its meaning are quite different.
Mersault seems merely tired, and it is hard to imagine that his
ambition ever amounted to much. Tarrou, on the other hand, was
once, by his own statement, an “agitator,’’ determined to right
the evils of society by political action, llis principal concern
was with human life — and the defiance of any system which
justified the taking of life, legally or otherwise. His ultimate
disillusionment with the political movement in which he was
involved stemmed from his realization that it, too, considered
firing squads and assassination means towards its ends. Mer
sault places a fairly high value on his own life as his sensual
existence and somewhat belated resistance to his own execu
tion demonstrate. As a murderer, however, he shows that the
price he places on other human life is considerably smaller.
Again, both Mersault and Tarrou collect trivia. Mersault has
a scrapbook in which he pastes items from the newspapers that
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“amuse” him. Tarrou keeps a diary in which he records the
activities and idiosyncrasies of people he observes. Judging by
the quality of the one item that is described as an addition to
the scrapbook, Mersault’s criterion for amusement here is that
which brings him sensual pleasure. Tarrou’s observations on
humanity include speculation on the possible sainthood of a
man who spits on cats from his balcony and another who mea
sures time by transferring dried peas from one pan to another at
a steady rate. On the one hand, there is pursuit of pleasure (or
perhaps flight from boredom), on the other, a vital interest in
human beings.
Alfred Kazin, in a review of a posthumous collection of some
of Camus’s essays, calls The Plague the anti-nihilistic succes
sor of The Stranger, “Camus’s one nihilistic work of fiction.”^
This is one significant aspect of the contrast between the
books. Mersault sets at zero the value of all formal religion,
morality, love and law. He is violently opposed to the religious
answer proposed by the priest who visits him in the cell. He
will not even pretend to observe the social standards of bereave
ment when his mother dies, except for the somewhat inexplicable
fact that he automatically wears a black band. And he says of
his crime, “it crossed my mind that one might fire, or not fire—
and it would come to exactly the same thing.”
Tarrou and Rieux make some nihilistic rejections of their
own. Neither believes in God. The apolitical Tarrou has rejec
ted the existent political order as well as any immediately
possible substitute for it. Neither is he able to offer Rambert a
moral basis for deciding whether to escape to his mistress or to
stay and fight the plague with them. Yet, their war on the
pestilence indicates a tough philosophy of their own quite
unlike anythingof Mersault’s, with the exception of the rationale
he develops in his cell to explain his life and death.
Dr. Rieux is provided with a foil in Father Paneloux, the
intense young priest who delivers a sermon explaining the
epidemic as divine retribution for the sins of Oran. The sermon
has a great impact upon Rieux, who imagines frequently that he
hears the flail of the plague chastising the city—Paneloux’s
metaphor. But Rieux rejects the cleric’s plea that all should
acquiesce spiritually in this punishment: “Until my dying day,
I shall refuse to love a scheme of things in which children are
put to torture.” Though Paneloux dies in the forefront of the
lAlfred Kazin, “A Condemned Man” (review of Resistance, Rebellion,
and Death), Reporter, Feb. 16, 1961, pp. 54-58.
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fight against the pestilence, he significantly refuses the care
of the doctor, just as Mersault refuses the ministrations of the
priest in his ordeal.
Thus Tarrou and Dr. Rieux are decisively committed to
combat death. They realize that in every case they are doomed
to eventual failure. Their awareness of their limitations is
significant. Rieux hopes only to heal man—he knows he cannot
save him. Tarrou wants to learn to be a saint—without God.
Rieux does not know at Tarrou’s death whether his friend
achieved the peace needed for his sainthood. He knows only
that he, Rieux, will never know lasting peace. The plague
never dies; it could lie dormant for years, awaiting the day
when, “for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would
rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy
city.
There is a deep individualism to Mersault that the underlying
sympathy of The Plague seems to deny. The Stranger seems at
times to have a sort of vague fellow feeling for Salamano and
the loss of his pet, for Raymond and his desire for brutal
revenge upon bis girl, and, at the end of his own life, for his
mother and her wish to start a new life in the home for the
aged. But even when he realizes that death is inevitable, it
does not lead him to sympathy for others who share his lot. He
is concerned only with his own destiny and even welcomes, in
the end, the antipathy of the rest of humanity: “For me to feel
less lonely, all that remained to hope was that on the day of
my execution there should be a huge crowd of spectators and
that they should greet me with howls of execration.” In this
attitude towards others, he can share “the benign indifference
of the universe.”
To the protagonists of The Plague, on the other hand, the
sense of human sympathy suggests collective action and
sharply limits the operation of purely self-directed motives.
Men battle the plague, not as individuals in herculean struggle,
but as members of sanitary squads. Rieux shares directly and
physically in the struggle of the dying Othon boy and refuses to
follow his own interests by escaping to his wife. The plague
represents a threat to all human life. Life is seen almost as a
single phenomenon, and the death of one man a threat to all.
Dr. Rieux takes pains to point out that heroism is not involved
in his and Tarrou’s struggle—only instinctive defense of the
common life: “The essential thing was to save the greatest
possible number of persons from dying. And to do this there
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was only one resource: to fight the plague. There was nothing
admirable about this; it was merely logical.”
Closely allied to the sympathy and feeling of community is
the victory that for most people signifies the end of the plague.
They knew now that if there is one thing one can always
yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love.” This pos
sibility presents itself twice to Mersault-in his girl friend
Marie and in his mother. He, of course, rejects it.
Even in The Plague, however, ‘‘for those who aspired
beyond and above the human individual towards something they
could not even imagine, there had been no answer.” And Mersault resembles here the heroes of Camus’s other book. For
‘‘Tarrou might seem to have won through to that hardly-come-by
peace of which he used to speak; but he had found it only in
death, too late to turn it to account.” Mersault, too, achieves
the philosophy that makes his aloneness meaningful only in
the last hours of his life. The difference is, of course, that he
had not aspired to anything.
In terms of The Plague, Mersault is guilty, though not by
the same code that sentenced him to death. The Stranger seems
to be executed for his failure to express the accepted cant of
bereavement at his mother’s death, for refusing to express
contrition for the murder he has committed, and for rejecting the
society’s religion. But, in addition, he has killed a man, and
for this Tarrou and Tieux would find him culpable. Tarrou would
say, as he says of Cottard’s approval of the plague, ‘‘for that
I am obliged to pardon.” For the sympathy, even where it does
not provide understanding, always involves forgiveness for
such an offense. Throughout The Plague the only crime is
murder or acquiesence in murder. The proper punishment,
however, must be other than capital.
The plague in many ways represents any form of tyranny:
physical, political or philosophical. This tyranny is resisted by
the collective efforts of men of good will. In the dichotomy of
victim and oppressor, Mersault has elements of each. Tarrou’s
father was a prosecuting attorney, righteously demanding the
death of a felon in much the same terms that Mersault’s is
demanded. It was against this that his son revolted. Yet,
Mersault’s casual shooting of the Arab, whether it was moti
vated by racial animosity, pure sadism or mere indifference,
represents that ‘‘most incorrigible vice ... the ignorance that
claims for itself the right to kill.”
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Mersault resolutely maintains his own independence and
honesty. He realizes his own inexorable destiny—that he must
die. His rejection of God means that, for him, this death is the
complete destruction of his all-important being.
Rieux, Tarrou and their fellows also realize that death is
inevitable, but they revolt against it passionately. From their
fight and from their observations of other men engage in the
conflict arises the conclusion, hardly suggested in The Stranger,
“that there are more things to admire in men than to despise.
Mersault’s honesty and courage are too sterile to be very
admirable.
Camus’s essay “The Myth of Sisyphus” sheds some light
on both the similarities and differences between the two novels.
Mersault is obviously the absurd hero. His love affair, the
murder and his Sundays are all absurd. They have no real
significance in any sense. He acts without reason—helps Ray
mond, agrees to marry Marie. Finally, in his realization of the
“indifference of the universe” he becomes aware, with a sort
of pleasure, of the absurdity of life itself.
For Rieux and Tarrou, the absurdity is apparent over a much
longer period of time. Their struggle is, nevertheless, vigorous.
And, as in the case of Sisyphus when he has reached the top of
the slope with his burden, there is a period of rest and a sense
of accomplishment and defiance before the rats emerge to
announce the beginning of the next plague. This accomplish
ment Mersault does not share. His absurdity lies in indifference
rather than in hopeless struggle. Here again, an exception must
be made for the conclusion of the book, for his efforts to appeal
his case and his hope that the knife might fail do represent a
brief resistance to the absurd fact of death ending the absurd
process of life.
From The Plague, and not at all from The Stranger, there
emerges an underlying humanism. Sartre, in an essay entitled
“Existentialism is a Humanism,” says that “when we say that
man is responsible for Himself, we do not mean that he is
responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is
responsible for all men.” This idea that the actions of one may
be a precedent for all and hence must be decided with that
eventuality in mind is suggested
in The Plague. If the
pestilence represents other kind of tyranny than that of disease
or death, or even if only these are in question, men choose to
acquiesce or resist at the peril that others will make the same
choice. The collective fight is the only answer to the collective
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acquiescence that Father Paneloux suggests. This humanism is
quite different from that which merely exalts mankind and its
goodness and which Camus specifically denies: “...our townfolk were like everyone else, wrapped up in themselves; in
other words they were humanists: they disbelieved in pesti
lences.” The plague exists, and these humanists die first,
“because they haven’t taken the proper precautions.” The sort
of humanism here recognizes the existence of plague. Since it
exists, it must be fougbt by men, for God will not intervene. It
is a demanding philosophy, and it can be said that The Stranger
recognizes the absence of God without accepting the commit
ment to fight that this absence requires. Apparently, by tbe
time he wrote The Plague, Camus had discovered that there was
more than one way to deal with absurdity.
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GOETHE AND PIRANDELLO
by
Paul L. Frank
An adequate interpretation of Pirandello’s play Six Charac
ters in Search of an Author must deal with various problems,
foremost among them the author’s concept of the nature of
reality.
Two groups of personages confront each other in that drama.
The members of a theatrical company, led by the Manager, are
people who can be found in any realistic play. The six charac
ters, however, have been “born of an author’s fantasy and
denied life by him.’’^ They were conceived in an authors
imagination, but he did not give life to them by making them
characters in a completed work of art. So they are “left alive,
and yet without life.’’^ As could be expected, at the first
appearance of these characters the question comes up how
“real” they are. The Father claims that parts represented on
the stage are “more alive than those who breathe and wear
clothes: beings less real perhaps, but truer.Later in the
play the Father admits that he and the other five characters
have no other reality outside of the theatrical illusion; but he
claims again that the comedy is truer and more real than human
beings such as the Manager.”* Thus the antithesis of “the real
versus “the true” is set up.
The question of reality versus truth appears also in other
plays by Pirandello. Probably more than one interpretation of
these two terms or concepts is possible. It can be assumed
that Pirandello wanted to show the relativity of truth. According
to Thomas Bishop, “in the frame of reference used by the
Italian, truth has the double meaning of what actually exists in
the world by generally accepted standards, and what individuals
believe, or make others believe, to be their personal truth.
This engagingly simple resolution of the above mentioned
antithesis of reality and truth is not contradicted by a different
interpretation, attempted in the following, which pertains
specifically to Six Characters in Search of an Author.
iNaked Masks: Five Plays, by Luigi Pirandello (New York, 1922),
p. 268.
^Ibid.
^Ibid., pp. 216 f.
^Ibid., pp. 264 ff.
^Pirandello and the French Theater (New York, 1960), p. 18.
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Pirandello studied at the University of Bonn. It is certain
that he became acquainted with the poetic works and ideas of
Goethe; he translated his Romische Elegien into Italian. There
seems to be a definite relation between the ideas embodied in
Pirandello’s above mentioned play and Goethe’s aesthetics.
Goethe did not lay down his theory of art in one systematic
work; his aesthetics must be inferred from various writings such
as essays, letters, and other literary works. The foremost
sources are a short essay, Einfache Nachahmung der Natur,
Manier, Stil, and another work, Der Sammler und die Seinigen.
The latter is a unique literary work; it consists of eight letters
of a semi-narrative nature, telling of an art collection, its
owner, and various persons who are either members of his
household or visitors. Each of them has a different approach to
art and, by developing these different standpoints, Goethe
presents various types of art lovers and artists.^
Goethe’s theories of art take the visual arts as point of
departure, yet they apply also to poetry, as will be shown by
their influence on Pirandello. Goethe distinguishes between the
following three stages of artistic accomplishment.
a) Mere imitation of nature (Einfache Nachahmung der Natur)
is the initial stage. Every artist should be able to represent
objects or persons as they are found in nature; especially those
which deviate from the normal will be good subjects of work of
art. For a student of natural history, such an imitation will be
valuable; artistically it will not give satisfaction for any length
of time.
b) The second stage is that of abstraction, which Goethe
calls Manier. The artist leaves out details of the subject and
sacrifices strict realism in favor of the representation of the
typical features of the subject. There is danger that the artist
may, hereby, depart from nature to such a large extent that
nothing is left of the subject and only an empty abstraction
remains, a result undesirable to Goethe.
c) To create a work of high art, the artist must find a com
promise between the mere imitation of nature and Manier; he
must reach the stage of what Goethe calls Stil. If he does, his
work will have three main qualities: artistic truth (Kunstwahrheit), beauty, and perfection. The last of these has to do with
^These two works of Goethe are found in Sophienausgabe, XLVII,
77 ff. and 119 ff. Goethe’s aesthetics is described and analyzed in
great detail by Matthijs Jolles in Goethes Kunstanschauung (Bern,
1957). Chapters 1 and 6 have been used particularly for this essay.
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the technical execution, the craftsmanship which the artist
must possess to create a work of high art. The concepts of
artistic truth and beauty are the ones which must be discussed
in connection with Pirandello’s play.
Goethe calls a work of art “true” if it is faithful to nature
but, at the same time, clearly shows those features which are
typical of the species to which the individual object belongs.
Thus the work of art should show the relationship of the spe
cific object to its model in the realm of ideas. Goethe s aesthe
tics is based on the doctrines of Neo-Platonism according to
which the realm of the ideas and ideals is the highest and
ultimate. Things of the existing, the “real” world are nothing
but shallow and imperfect images of the ideals. Goethe was
convinced that if artists only copy an object that exists in
nature, they represent reality (Wirklichkeit) but not truth
(Wahrheit). By studying many specimens of a species they will
discover the typical, lasting, and essential features which
characterize the whole species. He did not doubt that, apart
from the concrete objects, there exists a type which is free of
all the accidental qualities found in the many visible appear
ances and contains only the eternal and essential characteris
tics of the type. Thus Goethe said of the original plant (Ur~
pflanze): *‘There must be such: otherwise, how could I recognize
that this or that is a plant if they were not all formed after
one sample?”^
Thus Goethe expects a good artist to be able to see the
typical and lasting in the individual object. While remaining
faithful to nature, he should express and underline the general,
the typical. If he does, he has achieved artistic truth.
Goethe’s concept of beauty is related to that of truth. The
artist can achieve beauty only if he chooses something signifi
cant as the subject of his work of art. The thing represented
should have features which are typical and rf a general impor
tance. The pleasant outer appearance of the object and the
pleasing effect of the work of art are essential for its success,
but they depend not only on the manner of presentation but also
on the content, the subject represented. A sense of proportion
and orderliness will lead the artist to present a significant
object well and, hereby, achieve beauty.
All of Goethe’s utterances reported so far pertain, when
taken literally, to the visual arts. Yet, by implication, they tell
"^Italianenische Reise, Sophienausgabe, XXXI, 147 f. (my translation.)
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US how Goethe thought a poet should create literary characters.

They should be types hut not abstractions; they should show the
permanent and significant aspects of the human personality
and, at the same time, some minor, unessential features which
make such personages human rather than ideal heings. In his
best works Goethe has created such characters. He once said
that the poet should combine “truth” (Wahrheit) and “fiction”
{Luge) to create a “third,” namely a work of poetry. Talking of
the buildings of Palladio which he admired in Vicenza, he
remarked:
There really is something divine in his designs,
like the work of a great poet who, from truth and fiction, makes
a third creation which enchants us.”®
Pirandello realized the universality of Goethe’s concepts
and applied the idea of artistic truth to his six characters. They
are not “real” living persons, but they are “true” in the sense
of Goethe s writings on aesthetics. To define the difference
between a realistic person and a character, or type, Pirandello
used the criterion of permanence versus change. The Manager
and the Father discuss the nature of reality in Act 3. The
Father concedes that the reality of the six characters lies only
in the illusion of the play, but their reality is truer than that of
the Manager because it cannot change and is fixed forever.
The reality of living heings, however, “is a mere transitory
and fleeting illusion, taking this form today and that tomorrow,
according to the conditions....”^ Prior to this dialogue, the
Father had already referred to certain literary characters who
are immortal. He says in Act 1: “The man, the writer, the
instrument of the creation will die, hut his creation does not
die... Who was Sancho Panza? Who was Don Abhondio? Yet
they live eternally because they had the fortune to find a
fecundating matrix, a fantasy which could raise and nourish
them: make them live for ever.”^® Thus the Father considers
himself created as an immutable character and truer than per
sons of flesh and blood whose bodies and minds change con
stantly.
A significant proof of Pirandello’s indebtedness to Goethe’s
aesthetics can he found in the Preface which Pirandello wrote
to his play in 1925. In it he described how his fantasy made
these six characters appear to him, and explained why he
decided not to make them the protagonists of a completed
drama. These are Pirandello’s words:
8/fciW., XXX, 77.
^Naked Masks, p. 266.
10/feiW., p. 218.
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To me it was never enough to present a man or a
woman and what is special and characteristic about them
simply for the pleasure of presenting them; to narrate a
particular affair, ... to describe a landscape simply for
the pleasure of describing it.
There are some writers who do feel this pleasure...
They are, to speak more precisely, historical writers.
But there are others who ... feel a more profound
spiritual need on whose account they admit only figures,
affairs, landscapes which have been soaked in a particu
lar sense of life and acquire from it a universal value.
These are, more precisely, philosophical writers. I have
the misfortune to belong to these last.
I hate symbolic art in which the presentation loses all
spontaneous movement in order to become a machine, an
allegory ... The spiritual need I speak of cannot be
satisfied ... by such allegorical symbolism. This latter
starts from a concept ... The former on the other hand
seeks in the image — which must remain alive and free
throughout — a meaning to give it value.
Now, however much I sought, I did not succeed in
uncovering this meaning in the six characters. 11
Thus Pirandello expressed clearly that he felt unable to
impart to these six characters the two essentials of poetic
creation: universal meaning (artistic truth or Kunstwahrheii)
and actual vitality or freedom from mere allegorical symbolism.
At this point our analysis seems to have led to a contradic
tion. All through the play we are sympathetic with the six
characters and share the Father’s contention that he and the
members of the family represent “truth.” Yet, Pirandello
speaking for himself asserts the contrary. Perhaps the clue to
the solution of the problem which this difficult play offers lies
in this contradiction. Here is the conflict between the way the
six characters — and particularly the F'ather — think of them
selves as universally meaningful types, and the way the author
thinks of them. The Father considers himself to be a literary
type such as Sancho Panza or Don Juan or Faust, while Piran
dello sees in these six characters the unfortunate actors of a
sad entanglement, in the same class with those found in hun
dreds and hundreds of stories. For this reason the Father and,
at least, the Step-Daughter desire that the story be played, or
objectified and perpetuated into a work of art, while Pirandello
brings the whole drama to a frustrating conclusion which does
not allow the play to be performed,
pp. 364 f.
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In the Preface, Pirandello reports his final conclusion:
And here is the universal meaning at first vainly
sought in the six characters, now that, going on stage of
their own accord, they succeed in finding it within them
selves in the excitement of a desperate struggle which
each wages against the other and all wage against the
Manager and the actors, who do not understand them. 12
We now understand that the “truth” does not lie in the
personality of the six characters or in their sad, sordid relation
ship to each other, hut in their relation to a hostile world. It
lies in their desire for immortality, their wish to justify them
selves. This fulfillment is tragically denied to them.
We also see that Pirandello, a highly original poet and
thinker, has presented a unique kind of a dramatic conflict
which, at least to a significant degree, is based on an aesthetic
foundation. He has given a novel meaning to the old idea of a
play within a play. Upon an intellectual framework he has
constructed an artistically satisfying and stimulating drama.
^^Ibid.,

pp. 366 f.

1965, by Paul L. Frank
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THE MAKING OF A POET
by
John K. Coulter
On December 19, 1764, Oliver Goldsmith, a hack writer of
seven years’ experience, published The Traveller, a Prospect
of Society, his first major effort in poetry and a work which, he
says in his preface, he had begun in Switzerland in 1755. The
poem brought immediate and delighted praise to Goldsmith who
suddenly stood at the top of the literary world, no longer just
the amiable clown and author of easy and ingenious prose. His
reputation was raised to such an eminence that, as he moved
swiftly from poetry to novel to drama, his friend Johnson was
moved to remark “that Goldsmith was the best writer [I] ever
ever knew, upon every subject he wrote upon.’’^ His friends
were surprised by The Traveller (note Anthony Chamier’s “that
is believing a great deal’’ to believe that Goldsmith"wrote it),
the public was pleased (nineteen editions in twenty years), and
the reviewers were delighted.
No matter how much Goldsmith’s fortunes may have been
enhanced, however, the author is not the only one to profit from
The Traveller’s success. To the literary historian comes the
longei^lasting gain, an opportunity, fortunately well documented,
to witness the age’s first reactions to a major piece of literature.
Equally valuable is the attention that was focused by this
author s new stature on his critical views on poetry, many
expressed earlier but given then little note. In the reception
The Traveller received, in the poem itself, and in the author’s
remarks, a dynamic age of transition is held immobile, prepared
for examination.
Samuel Johnson himself led the reviewers, writing the
Critical Review consideration: “...we now congratulate the
public... on a production to which, since the death of Pope, it
will not be easy to find anything equal.”^ Privately he reacted
even more impressively. Boswell reported in his Tour of the
Hebrides that Johnson quoted from The Traveller “the character
of the British nation ...with such energy that the tear started
into the eye.”^ The Gentleman’s Magazine also felt moved to
^James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. G. B. Hill, rev. L. F. Powell
(6 vols., Oxford, 1934-50), II, 281.
2XVIII (December, 1764), 462.
^Life of Johnson, V, 344.
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“congratulate our poetical readers on the appearance of a new
poet so able to afford refined pleasure to true taste as the
writer of the Traveller.”London Chronicle repeated the
newness: “this ingenious gentlemem” has “a degree of poetical
merit beyond vdiat we have seen for several years.The
Monthly Review, while offering some minor criticism, too found
it “delightful” with “a refined sense of elegance, and a
correspondent happiness of expression.”^
Bennet Langton said, “There is not a bad line in that poem.”
Charles James Fox noted, “It was one of the finest poems in
the English language.” Johnson said later, “He deserved a
place in Westminster Abbey.This is extravagant praise, of
course, but the commentators felt it earned. When Boswell had
attempted to draw from Johnson the admission that Goldsmith
owed his place in “the public estimation” to Johnson, the reply
was, “Why, Sir, he has perhaps got sooner to it by his intimacy
with me.”® After The Traveller Goldsmith needed the support
of no one. Sir John Hawkins tells the story of the Earl of
Northumberland’s offer of assistance to which Goldsmith, in
something of a change since the Enquiry into the Present State
of Polite Learning, in which he had vehemently denounced
booksellers as leeches on the literary world, said: “I have no
dependence on the promises of great men: I look to the book
sellers for support; they are my best friends, and I am not
inclined to forsake them for others.”^ The pride of the earlier
unknown hack is still present, but his circumstances have so
altered as to allow both independence and perhaps a bit of
impertinence. It is interesting and ironic that he later wished
for Northumberland’s aid, but it was not at that time proffered.
The publication history of The Traveller presents the epitome
of literary success. The Cambridge Bibliography lists the
following: London editions — 1764, three in 1765, 1768, three
in 1770, 1774, 1778, 1786; Dublin editions — 1767, 1769, two or
three in 1770, possibly one in 1780; Philadelphia — 1768; and
Edinburgh — 1782 and 1787. Goldsmith could scarcely complain
fxXXIV (December, 1764), 594.
^December 18-20, 1764.
^XXXIl (January, 1765), 47.
^Li/e of Johnson, III, 152.
“James Prior, The Life of Oliver Goldsmith, M.B, 2 vols., (London,
1839), II, 40.
"Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. (London, 1787), p. 419.
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at this time as he had done earlier that the “publick make a
point to know nothing” of his work after thirteen editions in his
lifetime.
The review in the Monthly by John Langhorne, a minister in
the Established Church, though it declares The Traveller “one
of those delightful poems that allure by the beauty of their
scenery, a refined elegance of sentiment, and a corresponding
happiness of expression,”
illustrates the great weakness of
the periodical reviews of the age. Instead of concerning himself
with the three elements “that allure,” Langhorne devotes him
self rather to seeking out minor errors of statement. Goldsmith
himself, of course, had remarked that he read a poem to find out
something new and that he had little respect for more refine
ment. ^ He thus declared himself in advance a party to such
criticism. He had also, however, repeatedly complained of the
critic who confuses substance and trivialities. Langhorne
begins his comments by disputing Goldsmith’s prefatory state
ment that he is “not much solicitous to what reception it may
find.” This is a valid, though not very significant, point.
Goldsmith’s comment rather obviously is not important, but it is
in keeping with the despair which is a part of his subject matter.
His supposed indifference displays no more than the usual
exaggeration. Then Langhorne turns not to an irrelevant comment
but rather to a carping one. The “traveller” had said:
Where’er I roam, whatever realms I see.
My heart untravell’d fondly turns to thee:
Still to my Brother turns, with ceaseless pain.
And drags at each remove, a lengthening chain. (11. 7-10)
After praising the image, Langhorne says: “Nevertheless, it
may be somewhat difficult to conceive how a heart untravell’d,
can, at the same time, make farther removes.”
Here is the
critic of whom Goldsmith so heartily disapproved. Had Lang
horne been true to his Tory principles and less eager to seek
out quibbles, he would have cheered a sentiment he certainly
shared.
The review follows in this manner seeking out the insignifi
cant, the irrelevant, the picayune. Nowhere does Langhorne
mention that the poem concerns two conflicting passions in life,
^^Monihly Review, XXXII (January, 1765), 47-8.
^^Citizen of the World, Letter XCVII, Works, ed. J. M. W. Gibbs, 5
vols. (London, 1884), III, 358. Hereafter called Works.
^‘^Monthly Review, XXXII (January, 1765), 48.
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that which leads one to exclaim, “Creation’s Heir, the world,
the world is mine” and that which brings about mourning for the
lost glories of home. Langhorne seems, in not listening very
closely to what Goldsmith had to say, to have missed the
point.
In the prefatory letter which dedicates the poem to his
younger brother Henry, Goldsmith indicates the significance he
finds in his work:
It will also throw a light upon many parts of it, when
the reader understands, that it is addressed to a man who,
despising fame and fortune, had retired early to a happi
ness and obscurity, with an income of forty pounds a-year.
I now preceive, my dear brother, the wisdom of your
humble choice. You have entered upon a sacred office,
where the harvest is great, and the labourers are but few:
while you have left the field of ambition, where the
labourers are many, and the harvest not worth carrying
away. But of all kinds of ambition - what from the
refinement of the times, from different systems of criti
cism, and from the divisions of party — that which pursues
poetical fame is the wildest. 13
This passage, almost always quoted by biographers, has been
interpreted as a sign of Goldsmith’s sentimentalism in regard to
the simple rustic life. But few commentators have noted that
despite his obvious weariness of the struggles of literary
London, Goldsmith never did go home. Indeed, he never returned
after leaving for school in Edinburgh when he was but twentyfour. It is true that he frequently longed for Ireland and his
childhood home and often planned to return. In his letters to his
family written during his early struggles as an author, time and
again he speaks of such desires. But for several reasons he did
not return.
,
, , , ,
,
j t •
In his Enquiry the young author had declared an underlying
element in his personal philosophy:
Reason and appetite are ... masters of our revels in turn,
and as we incline to the one or pursue the other, we riva
angels or imitate the brutes. In the pursuit of intellectual
pleasure lies every virtue; of sensual, every vice.
It is this difference of pursuits which marks the morals
and characters of mankind; which lays the line between
the enlightened philosopher and the half-taught citizen;
between the civil citizen and illiterate peasant; between
the law-obeying peasant and the wandering savage of
Africa....
13vyor^s, II, 3.
Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe,
Chapter XIV, lVori5, III, 527.
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Goldsmith did not return to Ireland, no matter how attractive it
could be and how difficult the life he led, because “Creation s
Heir the world, the world is mine.” (1. 50) Creation’s heir is
the wanderer, and the wanderer is Goldsmith. The pursuit
of intellectual pleasure lay in a broader, not narrower, world,
even though this course was fraught with uncertainties. It is
interesting that the concluding lines of this poem were written
by Johnson as he helped Goldsmith with a final revision.!^
Goldsmith’s lines
Why have I stray’d from pleasure and repose.
To seek a good each government bestows? (11. 425-6)
raise a question he is unable to answer with any assurance.
Seven years of writing vast quantities of material, none of
which bore his signature, was not a very firm basis for talk of
the glories of the search. Hence, Johnson helped with the
conclusion. There is even something appropriate about John
son’s aid in this way, for Johnson himself knew the sentimental
journey back to Lichfield.
After addressing his brother Henry in his Dedication, Gold
smith lists his complaints about the state of literature which
cause him to doubt the wisdom of his course in life. He is
unhappy because painting and music, being less intellectually
demanding, have made inroads into the province of poetry, taking
some of the rewards poets were wont to claim. He had long felt
a need for but had been unable to gain
subsistence and
respect,” “rewards congenial to [genius’] nature.
He is
unhappy about the state of poetry itself, what with blank verse,
Pindaric odes, and other such “absurdities.
But these are
lesser reasons:
...there is an enemy to this art still more dangerous, — I
mean party. Party entirely distorts the jud^ent, and
destroys the taste. When the mind is once infected with
this disease, it can only find pleasure in what contributes
to increase the distemper. Such readers generally admire
some half-witted thing. ...Him they dignify with the name
poet: his tawdry lampoons are called satires....
Thomas Hobbes, in expressing a typically Augustan attitude,
declared any thought suspect without a '^steddy direction to
some approved end.”l^ He was most fearful of the “steddy,”
for he saw the unrestrained imagination leading awry. But
^^Life of Johnson, II, 6.
^^Enquiry, Chapter X, Works, III, 502.
Leviathan (Oxford, n.d.), p. 6.
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Goldsmith’s fears focused more on the “approved direction.’’
ffe emphasized throughout his career the misuse of literature for
narrow, often political purposes. He was willing to risk certain
innovations. Poetry was not only losing its form to foolish
innovations; it was losing its honesty of purpose. Satire’s
proper role was “deliberately reinforcing the agreed standards
of the age by pointing at the eccentric, the anti-social, the
freethinker, the profligate, the antinomian.’’Goldsmith’s view
is as conservative. His friend Burke remarked, “We are resolved
to keep an established church, an established monarchy, an
established aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in
the degree it exists, and in no greater. ...It has been the misfoi^
tune (not as these gentlemen think it, the glory) of this age,
that everything is to be discussed, as if the constitution of our
country is to be subject rather of altercation than enjoyment.’’
Earl Miner, in his “The Making of The Deserted Village,'
argues with great merit that the revolution which Goldsmith
deplored was striking not only the literature with which he was
most concerned, but the whole social, religious, and political
structure of society.^® His “sweet Auburn was no more, but
also no less, the victim of this change than were usefulness
and pleasure, conventionally defined, as purposes in writing.
The revolution was total, and Goldsmith found great sadness in
the fact.
Had The Traveller, however, no significance beyond this,
those nineteenth-century critics who found Goldsmith merely
sweet and sentimental would be correct, but such is not the
case. As has been noted before, one of Goldsmith s often used
devices is the disinterested, though not uninterested, observer.
The traveller is such a man. Like the Citizen of the World, like
the Man-in-Black, like George Primrose, the traveller is an
exile, condemned by circumstances, perhaps by his nature, to
rest on the mountain top observing a life in which he can never
wholly participate. Such a detachment is certainly not unique in
eighteenth-century literature. It is essentially the trait at the
heart of the foreign observer essay on which Goldsmith called
I®James Sutherland, A Preface to Eighteenth Century Poetry (Oxford,
1948), p. 39.
I^Edmund Burke, Re flections on the Revolution in France (New York,
1953), p. 100.
^®Earl Miner, “The Making of the Deserted Village," Huntington
Library Quarterly, XXII (1958), 125-141.
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for his pattern. It is, moreover, a trait completely in keeping
with the Augustan emphasis on control and restraint, of the fear
of an emotional involvement which blinds the reason.
Goldsmith does not in The Traveller offer any explanation of
why the exile chose his particular path, though the question
quoted above indicates that the choice was a deliberate, if not
fclly understood, one. When he speaks in his preface of his
brother’s ’’wisdom” in remaining at home, he points up the
focus in this poem on the despair wrought by the choice of the
wandering course. Yet he also makes, clear that no return is
contemplated, and in fact he indicates by the mountain-top view
that no return is possible.
An examination of the pattern of his subject matter leads to
the realization of its similarity to the structure of his earlier
Enquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe,
which in turn points up a major theme in the two works. Gold
smith seems strongly impressed by the dissimilarity in the
various societies of Europe, the differences in taste in polite
learning, in governmental forms, indeed in national character. At
the same time he is very much aware of the fact that the citizens
of each country can and do adjust themselves to local circum
stances and manage to achieve rather similar states of happi
ness.
In every government, though terrors reign.
Though tyrant kings, or tyrant laws restrain.
How small, of all that human hearts endure.
That part which laws or kings can cause or cure.
(11. 424-27)
This observation leads him to the conclusion that happiness is
not the product of government but rather ’’centres only in the
mind.” (1. 421) As he concludes that there is not one system
which seems more productive of happiness than another, he
comes to the realization that the ’’bliss” he seeks comes in
finding a “spot of all the world my own.” (1. 30) Thus it is not
rural Ireland he here apostrophizes, but rather “home,” a place
where one belongs, where he finds his family circle, where he
need not struggle. This is essentially the conclusion reached in
the Enquiry when he noted: “The man who in this age is
enamoured of the tranquil joys of study and retirement, may in
the next, should learning be fashionable no longer, feel an
ambition of being foremost at a horse course; or, if^such be the
absurdity of the times, of being himself a jockey.”
Enquiry, Chapter XIV, H'or^s, III, 527.
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An attempt to determine the reasons that the poem became
such a great success so quickly must take note of the fact that
in the comments and reviews which remain from the time of
publication scarcely a mention of Goldsmith’s ideas is made.
Boswell records favorable remarks made by virtually all of the
Johnson circle, but no comment goes beyond a generalized, if a
very enthusiastic, approval. Johnson’s note that his is the best
since Pope is often reflected, but neither Johnson nor his
imitators explain what in the work causes them to feel this way.
Such a circumstance would seem to lead to the conclusion that
Goldsmith had said nothing which would occasion added com
ment Certainly that home is comfortable and wandering lonely
is not something to be disputed in an age generally quite con
servative. Open to varying definition, however, is happiness as
the goal of human life. In this work, as in many of those of
Goldsmith, despite the extremely strong attraction of the simple,
rustic life, something in the nature of some men, including the
traveller, forbids an easy and pleasant definition of happiness.
It is not until The Deserted Village and, more particularly. The
Vicar of Wakefield that his examination of this “home” becomes
sufficiently sharp to arouse the suspicion that all is not perfect
in such a retirement. It is true that Langhorne, in the Monthly,
had mentioned three specific items of which he approved: the
beauty of [the] scenery, a refined sense of elegance of senti
ment, and a corresponding happiness of expression. He had
not, however, asked why the exile had come about or whether it
might not be an inevitable part of the character of the man.
The nineteenth century, which was as fond of The Traveller
as the eighteenth, knew quite well why it felt attracted to this
poem. Horatio Sheafe Krans presents the epitome of this view:
It is for its fair landscapes, so delicately drawn, so
pleasantly coloured, so suffused with the poet s own
tender thoughts and feelings, that we prize the poem; and
it is because of the penetrating sweetness with which
Goldsmith gives expression to his wistful longings for old
scenes and old places, and because of his abounding selfpity for the unkind fate that left him ever climbing a
mounting wave of troubles and perplexities, that the poem
draws all who read it under the spell of its delicious
melancholy.
Nowhere is there mentioned that the traveller is a self-exile
who has produced the “fate” Krans speaks of. Instead all
22“Inti-oduction,” The
of Oliver Goldsmith, ed. Peter Cunning
ham, 10 vols. (New York, 1908), I, 1.
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attention is on sweetness, wistful longings, and deliciousness.
Such a comment is the hand-maiden of the persecuted genius
school of biographers, and it ignores the fact that, while longing
for home, a hard-headed Goldsmith recognizes both the inevita
bility of the original exile and the impossibility of returning
home.
Goldsmith had early in his career developed views on poetry
to which he consistently adhered in his later, more successful
days. In his The Deserted Village he spoke thus of poetry:
Thou source of all my bliss, and all my woe.
That found’st me poor at first, and keep’st me so;
Thou guide, by which the nobler arts excel,
Thou muse of every virtue, fare thee well! (11. 413-16)
In this statement he recognizes that poetry, defined as an
attitude as found in Johnson and Smollett, is that which has
exiled him at the same time that it freed him from the pleasant
stultification of rural life. Here he insists rests “every virtue,”
and hence he here explains why he is evitably an exile.
Here, as in other types of literature, he recognized that
marked change was underway, and as usual his view was basi
cally the conservative one. Indeed, he so disapproved the new
directions of poetry that he presented his major comment in this
form in two Citizen of the World essays which he appropriately
entitled “The English Still Have Poets, Though Not Versifiers”
and “Almost Every Subject of Literature Has Been Already
Exhausted.”23 In the former he wrestles with the problem of
defining poetry, and in that process he reveals one side of the
dilemma in which he found himself on this subject. He notes
that “The ignorant term that alone poetry which is couched in a
certain number of syllables in every line, where a vapid thought
is drawn out into a number of verses of equal length, and per
haps pointed with rhymes at the end.”24 This is one definition
with which he heartily disagreed. It should be noted that, in his
Enquiry in speaking of literature in general, he had expressed
the belief that the misuse of literature, particularly by the
unimaginative learned and by the critics, was a much greater
danger than was the more often feared innovation.23 At the same
time the second horn of his dilemma lies in the opposite ex
treme. After saying that “The musical period in prose is
23Letters XL and XCVII, Works, III, 152-54 and 356-59.

24Letter XL, Works, III, 152.
^^Enquiry/f Chapter 1, passim^ Works^ III, 465-67,
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confined to a very few changes,” he charges that the new poets
are guilty of such a literary sin: “few [of these poets] have
any idea of musical variety, but run on in the same monotonous
flow through the whole poem.”26 He insists that “good sense
and a fine ear, which rules can never teach,” are what produce
good poetry.2^ He is, of course, here subject to that special
misunderstanding reserved for any man who refuses to submit to
tbe tyranny of disjunction.
Instead of joining tbe extremes, he argues that “rapturous
flowings of joy, or the interruptions of indignation, require
accents placed entirely different, and a structure consonant to
the emotions they would express. Changing passions, and
numbers changing with those passions, make the whole secret of
Western as well as Eastern poetry.”^® Though this is clearly a
restatement of Alexander Pope’s sound-and-sense doctrine, it is
also a keystone in Goldsmith’s. In fact, he directly argues that
“the practice of the last age appears to me superior [to that
of this]: they [sic] submitted to the restraint of numbers and
similar sounds; and this restraint, instead of diminishing,
augmented the force of their sentiment and style.
In speaking of the essence of poetry, rather than of the
means through which poetry is revealed. Goldsmith again dis
approves strongly with the change which was underway. Though
he entitles one of his essays “The English Still Have Poets,
Though Not Versifiers,” he is not speaking of the Grays of the
time: “...their Johnsons and Smolletts are truly poets, though
for aught I know they never made a single verse in their whole
lives,” but “many of the writers of their modern odes, sonnets,
tragedies, or rebuses” “deserve not the name.”^*^ In arriving at
such a judgment he presents his definitions of poetry and of the
poet. Poetry is “glowing sentiment, striking imagery, concise
expression, natural description, and modulated periods,” all of
which “make way to every passion.In order to produce such
works, a man must be “furnished with that strength of soul,
sublimity of sentiment, and grandeur of expression which
constitutes the character” and must be he who “ever proceeds
^^Citizen of the World, Letter XL, Works, III, 154.

^-^Ibid.
‘^^Ihid.
’^^Ibid., Ill, 153.
30/feirf., Ill, 152.

^^Ibid.
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first, treading unbeaten paths, enriching his native funds, and
employed [sic] in new adventures.”32 Thus in his definitions
he finds unacceptable the man who is just a rules follower and
also the man who is unable to submit his work to the proper
restraints.
Although the most important idea in his definition of poetry
is the making way to every passion, this can be, and perhaps in
the past too often has been, a deceptive doctrine. It does indeed
seem to make acceptable the sentimental view of his work.
Therefore this idea must be balanced with his equally strong
assertion that a person reads a poem “to be told something.
Instead too often one “opens the book, and there finds very
good words truly, and much exactness of rhyme, but no infoimation. A parcel of gaudy images pass [sic] on before his imagina
tion like the figures in a dream; but curiosity, induction, reason,
and the whole train of affections are fast asleep.” In works of
this sort the reader must “first leave his good sense behind
him.”33 Of su ch poetry Goldsmith strongly disapproved, going
to the extreme of reporting that he seldom read beyond the title
of what he called “gentle poetry.”3"^ He sums up his dislikes
thus;
“...all odes upon winter, or summer, or autumn — in short,
all odes, epodes, and monodies whatever — shall hereafter
be deemed too polite, classical, obscure, and refined to
be read, and entirely above human comprehension. Pas
torals are pretty enough — for those that like them; but to
me Thyrsis is one of the most insipid fellows I ever
conversed with; and as for Corydon, I do not choose his
company. Elegies and epistles are very fine to those to
whom they are addressed; and as for epic poems, I am
generally able to discover the whole plan in reading the
first two pages.”33
Such views as these lead one to expect more from The
Traveller than mere sentimentalism. When the traveller remarks
that he can “find no spot of all the world my own (1. 30), but
rather is
Impell’d, with steps unceasing, to pursue
Some fleetine good, that mocks me with the view
(11. 25-26)
he follows this with the contention that, in speaking of the

32;fe:V.
33Letter XCVII, Works, III, 358.

34/i,w.

35/fcjV., Ill, 359.
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towns, fields, lakes, and swains,
for me your tributory stores combine;
Creation’s heir, the world, the world is mine! (11. 49-50)
Thus poetry becomes for the traveller the “source of all my
bliss, and all my woe,” as he later remarks in The Deserted
Village.^^ The poetic spirit, as he defines it in regard to the
Johnsons and the Smolletts, both exiles him and frees him from
the narrowness and stultification of rural Ireland. It is indeed
the “nurse of every virtue.”
^^The Deserted Village, Works, II, 44, 1. 413.
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